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ABSTRACT
CHRISTOPHER EDWARD NUNNERY. Advances in modern botnet
understanding and the accurate enumeration of infected hosts. (Under the direction
of DR. BRENT BYUNGHOON KANG)
Botnets remain a potent threat due to evolving modern architectures, inadequate
remediation methods, and inaccurate measurement techniques. In response, this re-
search exposes the architectures and operations of two advanced botnets, techniques
to enumerate infected hosts, and pursues the scientific refinement of infected-host enu-
meration data by recognizing network structures which distort measurement. This
effort is motivated by the desire to reveal botnet behavior and trends for future mit-
igation, methods to discover infected hosts for remediation in real time and threat
assessment, and the need to reveal the inaccuracy in population size estimation when
only counting IP addresses. Following an explanation of theoretical enumeration
techniques, the architectures, deployment methodologies, and malicious output for
the Storm and Waledac botnets are presented. Several tools developed to enumerate
these botnets are then assessed in terms of performance and yield. Finally, this study
documents methods that were developed to discover the boundaries and impact of
NAT and DHCP blocks in network populations along with a footprint measurement
based on relative entropy which better describes how uniformly infections communi-
cate through their IP addresses. Population data from the Waledac botnet was used
to evaluate these techniques.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Continuous increases in malware sophistication have resulted in tuned propagation
vectors, formidable defensive technologies, and heightened architectural complexity
when rallying behavior is implemented. The underground economy which now largely
motivates malware development has acted as an evolutionary catalyst, where profit,
efficiency, and infection longevity are encouraged. The end result of this activity is
malicious code that spreads tenaciously throughout the Internet, enacts considerable
harm, and resists removal or incapacitation.
While there are numerous fundamental types of malware, each deserving of at-
tention with respect to understanding their behaviors and developing remediation
techniques, the research presented in this thesis focuses on botnet malware. This
focus is motivated by the generally nebulous understanding for modern botnet struc-
tures and the accompanying difficulties in estimating the threat a given botnet posses.
Thus, this research intends to both refine architectural and behavioral knowledge for
advanced botnets and exhibit methods to accurately evaluate their size. Distortion in
botnet size estimation can occur through poorly designed enumeration tools which fail
to cover all regions or tiers in a botnet, and is commonly introduced by DHCP churn
and the presence of NAT devices, which cause over and under-counting, respectively.
The botnets surveyed in this study are Storm and Waledac which can be consid-
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ered both modern and advanced given their topologies, defensive mechanisms, and
communication protocols. Each use architectures and communication protocols with
peer-to-peer elements and creative use of DNS. Storm and Waledac, with similar
topologies and a probable shared lineage, fast-flux DNS schemes are used.
In this study, following an elucidation of motivations and related work in Chapter 1,
methods to enumerate modern botnet architectures are defined and briefly described
in terms of advantages, limitations and probable yield in Chapter 3. A deployment
path for these tools given required knowledge and yield is then provided. The ar-
chitectures and behaviors for Storm and Waledac are then presented in Chapter 4,
providing illuminating details not found in other literature regarding protocols, defen-
sive measures, and malicious output. This is followed by an attempt to characterize
the performance and yield provided by several enumeration techniques when applied
to these two botnets in Chapter 5.
This study then provides methods to discover NAT and DHCP boundaries in a
botnet population, and proposes an entropy-based method to quantify IP address
inflation in Chapter 6. Entropy-based inflation measurements are capable of describ-
ing the uniformity of the distribution of infected hosts, and thus differ from pure IP
address to unique infection ID ratios. These methods are applied to data obtained
from the Waledac botnet.
The sum total of the research presented in this thesis contributes significant ad-
vances in modern botnet understanding, the development and evaluation of enumer-
ation technologies, and methods to discover and characterize distortion in population
estimation.
CHAPTER 2: HISTORY AND MOTIVATION
This section provides information critical to the understanding of enumeration
techniques and the motivation behind the research. Following a discussion of the
nature of botnet malware, the topologies of two advanced botnets are described.
Fast-flux DNS services are also elucidated, given the newness of this technology, their
frequent deployment and use within botnets, and the potential to leverage this service
for enumeration. This section concludes with a delineation of related research and
publications which complement our work as well as form its underpinnings.
2.1 Botnets
Botnets may be loosely defined as collections of computing systems comprised by
a common malware variant which can be instructed en masse by a framework or
entity typically known as a “botmaster.” The term “bot” is a colloquialism of ‘the
word “robot” which has garnered use given the autonomous nature of the individual
infected nodes participating in these systems. The nature of the node organization
and the methods of command distribution is referred to as the botnet’s architecture.
Botnets have traditionally employed central servers for command and control (C&C)
functions, but have recently used more resilient peer-to-peer based topologies. This
transition can be considered evolutionary in nature, and consistent with other types
of malware in their consistent increases in sophistication.
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The large number of compromised computing systems present in any given botnet
provide the botmaster with substantial bandwidth, IP address diversity, data pro-
cessing and storage, and potentially sensitive and valuable local information, such as
usernames, passwords, and credit card data. These resources may be easily leveraged
and exploited for malicious purposes. Functionally, botnets are most commonly used
for unsolicited email dispersion and denial of service attacks. Fast-flux DNS resolution
and network scanning activities may also occur by botnets but are generally for self-
serving purposes. Network scanning is often seen in botnets that self-propogate with
worm-like behavior. Spam email output may also be used for botnet self-propagation.
2.2 Infected Host Enumeration
The enumeration of infected hosts participating in a botnet is essential for threat
estimation and often is a prelude to mitigation. Methods to enumerate hosts therefore
deserve attention and critique to facilitate further development and refinement.
The knowledge of the IP addresses of infected systems is directly applicable to a
number of remediation techniques. Namely, blacklisting of these systems is facili-
tated. Additionally, enumeration provides insight into the sizes and distribution of
individual botnets, allowing the malware defense community to respond proportion-
ately to threats. This study works under the assumption that other, more traditional
methods of malware mitigation, such as signature-based anti-virus software are inad-
equate to remediate entire botnets. The aggressive polymorphism exhibited by all of
the malware variants discussed in this study thwarts signature-based detection at a
host level, unless current malware signatures are distributed extraordinarily quickly.
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By discovering infected hosts participating in botnets through enumeration and lim-
iting their traffic at core Internet routers or other major hops and their interaction
with services available on the Internet (specifically mail servers), botnet activity can
be more effectively and efficiently suppressed.
Room for improvement exists for current enumeration techniques, and new node-
discovery techniques must be developed for novel botnet architectures, which this
study intends to demonstrate. The evaluation of existing, improved, and newly de-
veloped enumeration methods in terms of their coverage and performance should
highlight limitations and weaknesses while characterizing probable yield. This should
allow readers to evaluate and improve their own implementations of enumeration
methods, following what hopefully is accelerated development and deployment.
2.3 Related Work
Several works have been created in the last decade which have addressed the prob-
lem of fundamentally understanding the advent of bot networks and their behav-
ior [26, 6]. Dagon et al. later provided a taxonomy of botnet structures [8]. These
studies advanced the understanding of early botnet architectures and provided initial
analysis and detection methodologies.
In an exploration of the history of botnets and their architectures, Grizzard et al.
presented a case study on an early (January 2007) version of the peer-to-peer based
Storm botnet [10]. Stewart, who presented the first exploration in Storm’s intrica-
cies [32] furthered the understanding of this botnet by later exposing its hierarchical
nature [33]. The architectural characteristics of the decentralized Storm and Nugache
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botnets were compared by Stover et al. in terms of their command and control strate-
gies, bootstrapping methods, encryption, DNS use, and update mechanisms [36]. The
botnets presented in these studies demonstrated the kind of unbridled damage which
can occur when a botnet introduces a previously unseen architecture to the Internet,
and the inability of the network security community to immediately respond to these
radically new and sophisticated botnet topologies.
Kanich et al. [14] and Kreibich et al. [16] explored the spamming model used by
the Storm botnet, documenting the quantity of spam sent and the amount which
resulted in “conversion,” where a recipient executes a binary or makes a purchase on
a website using a URL that was distributed from the botnet. Their method involved
infiltrating the botnet and rewriting command and control data that passed through
their custom nodes.
Bearing a strikingly similar architecture and behavioral characteristics to Storm,
the communication protocol and operations of the Waledac botnet may be found
various published work [31, 5, 34, 24]. This research helped define the botnet’s com-
munication protocol and exposed its vulnerabilities. The work by Sinclair et al. also
discussed weaknesses in its architecture which would allow for the possibility of direct
remediation and incapacitation of the network [31].
In response to the rapid advances in botnet sophistication primarily the advent of
the Storm botnet, several research groups have pursued possible mitigation strategies
for these formidable types of botnets. Holz et al. presented an initial attempt to
enumerate and mitigate the Storm botnet [12]. For enumeration, Sybil nodes were
deployed to passively measure nodes present in the network. A crawler was also used
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to repeatedly send route requests to also measure the number of present bot nodes.
Two mitigation techniques were also proposed, one based on publishing erroneous
hashes on the network in bulk and another using Sybil “Eclipse” poisoning. These
techniques were mildly successful.
Host-based mitigation technologies have also been crafted to remediate the botnet
threat. Bothunter [11] is one such host-based protection method, which employs IDS
(Intrusion Detection System) functionality in recognizing established Storm-related
network flows. Host-based IDS systems would prove to be effective in mitigating
botnet threats for small networks, but like all host-based solutions, scalability is
difficult. Further complicating the ease of use and effectiveness of host-based solutions
is the need to propagate active and accurate traffic signatures.
Characteristics and behaviors of fast-flux DNS systems in botnets were explored by
Nazario et al. [23]. The authors noted that by using active DNS mining, insight into
the sizes of botnet fast-flux operations and botnets themselves could be gained. This
technique used repeated, not recursive, queries. Based on enumeration data from a
network crawler, the authors estimated that approximately 1% of the nodes in the
Storm botnet participated in its fast-flux DNS scheme.
Given the flurry of research on the Storm botnet and the infiltration attempts made
by several large universities, Kanich et al. presented a study addressing the prob-
lem of filtering nebulous traffic from gathered data when crawling this network [15].
Completeness in enumeration for this botnet was pursued by Kang et al. [13] where
the authors demonstrated that network crawlers could not discover bot nodes behind
firewalls or those residing in NAT networks. This work also studied how many Sybil
8
nodes were needed to achieve complete enumeration through passive monitoring.
Over and under-counting in a botnet population was briefly discussed by Stone-
Gross et al. in an exploration of the Torpig botnet [35]. The authors also use the
methods in Rajab et al [4] to describe the differences between a “live” size and a total
footprint or node count in the aggregate. Kang et al. and Kanich et al. described
methods to improve the completeness or accuracy of enumeration efforts for the Storm
botnet [13, 15].
Weaver proposed a probabilistic model for the C variant of Conficker to estimate
the total population given the scanning behavior of a single node [41], and showed
how to use correlation among activity in adjacent net blocks to discover large regions
of DCHP activity [42]. Xie et al. created a tool, UDmap [44], to process server logs,
identify dynamic IP addresses, and track IP inflation among web users. Yu et al. use
publicly available statistics on Internet usage and infection longevity to adjust for
NAT and DHCP in ranking countries by prevalence of infection [45]. D’Acunto et al.
built a Bittorrent-based, P2P system that interacts with STUN servers to categorize
UDP traffic behavior of NATs and firewalls on the Internet [7].
Relative entropy, used in the calculation of IP inflation in this study, has been pre-
viously used in anomaly detection as a measure of divergence between an observed
stochastic traffic profile and a baseline, that is often useful for detecting botnet scan-
ning activity [40, 25].
CHAPTER 3: ENUMERATION TECHNOLOGIES
3.1 Methods
This section provides an overview enumeration techniques to discover nodes par-
ticipating in botnets with architectures employing peer-to-peer routing. Probable
coverage provided by each technique is discussed, in addition to general limitations
and advantages specific to each method. These methods, some of which have been
explored in related work, were refined during the study of two modern botnets with
advanced architectures: Storm and Waledac. In Chapter 5, these methods are com-
paratively evaluated in terms of coverage and deployment time.
3.1.1 Understanding Bootstrapping
As several of the enumeration techniques described in this section begin by exploit-
ing bootstrapping mechanisms available to a botnet, a brief description of fundamental
bootstrapping methodologies is warranted. The bootstrapping process occurs early
in bot malware execution, and describes the means a node employs to discover one or
more nodes already active or recently active in the botnet it wishes to join. Two types
of bootstrapping are used: hard-coded IP addresses or hard-coded domain names.
Some malware variants use both techniques. Bot nodes then integrate themselves
into a network using these data or peer retrieval points.
IP addresses hardcoded in bot binaries generally belong to reliable systems with
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high uptime, command and control servers, or recently seen peers in the network
which will likely be available when then binaries are executed. The process of frequent
binary repacking occurring in propagation campaigns provides the opportunity for
botnet operators to inject “fresh” IP addresses in repacked binaries with each new
build. A limitation of hard-coded IP addresses for bootstrapping is the possibility
that the systems associated with these addresses will become unavailable, particularly
if a binary is executed long after distribution. As a result, binaries often use embedded
domain names as a redundant bootstrap mechanism.
Hard-coded domains names provide the botnet operator with the ability to change
IP addresses for a rallying or bootstrap point. Further, these domains may be a part of
a fast-flux DNS scheme, where corresponding A-records for a domain change rapidly.
Unlike hardcoded IP addresses, hardcoded domains, particularly those with fast-flux
behavior, provide a means for enumeration when domains resolve to IP addresses for
bot nodes. Fast-flux DNS functionality and the potential for enumeration is described
in Section 3.1.4.
3.1.2 Passive Infiltration-Based Peer-Monitoring
In peer-to-peer based botnets which utilize participating nodes for traffic routing
or indexing, enumeration and other intelligence gathering can occur by deploying
Sybil nodes throughout the network. In architectures employing distributed hash
tables (DHT) as seen in the Storm botnet, monitoring nodes can be deployed evenly
throughout the key-space. When a sufficient number of monitoring nodes are deployed
throughout an addressing range, one can effectively discover all the bot nodes present
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in a botnet based on incoming searches and other data the monitoring nodes are
tasked with routing.
This enumeration strategy is least disruptive and noticeable when employed in a
passive mode. The deployed nodes which gather bot identities can avoid seeking out
other nodes. Enumeration occurs via the logging of inbound traffic. This form of enu-
meration is relatively stealthy as aggressive botnet address traversals are not required
and legitimate participating nodes do not need to be interrogated. Enumeration may
occur when one is familiar with a popular peer-to-peer protocol and associated net-
work which a botnet uses. Knowledge of specific botnet protocols is not necessarily
required, but is needed when botnets use atypical, custom peer-to-peer protocols.
With an active enumeration methodology via botnet infiltration, masquerading
nodes can aggressively insert their identifying information into peer lists to increase
their network presence and traffic within a network and learn more about other botnet
participants. This is due to the expectation that more routing and search traffic will
be sent through the infiltrating nodes. Active enumeration can also occur by directly
querying nodes for their identifying information, but this is generally referred to as
network crawling, discussed in the next section. Note that these two enumeration
strategies, crawling and enumeration via infiltration can overlap in functionality.
The primary advantage of this enumeration method is the ability to view most of
the traffic within a botnet with sufficient Sybil distribution. This is possible even in
the face of partitioning, assuming the area(s) of the botnet which use peer-to-peer
communication are tasked with data distribution and service hosting for other nodes
in the botnet beyond partitioning layers.
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The main disadvantages of this technique are the potential necessity for knowledge
of communication protocols and the need for a large number of deployed monitoring
nodes which are evenly distributed across the network addressing system. Virtual-
ization or running numerous instances of Sybil nodes on a system can nullify this
limitation. The possession of large numbers of diverse IP addresses may also be re-
quired, as Sybili attack activity may otherwise be noticeable, particularly in botnets
with small populations. Finally, node-vetting may be used to thwart mass Sybil node
ingress by establishing a trust or reputation system which necessitates that the nodes
already participating or a vetting agent approve of a joining node. An additional
disadvantage of this technique is the need to expose ones systems to the network,
and, in turn, the botnet owners. Direct retaliation can result.
For passive infiltration-based enumeration, botnet coverage is a function of time,
node distribution across indexing space, node quantity, and traffic rates, which are
dependent on botnet communication protocols and traffic routing behavior. The
architecture of a given botnet also plays a role, as partitioning or tiering can limit
the ability to discover all nodes regardless of these other characteristics.
In this dissertation, data is exhibited from passive enumeration attempts through
infiltration on the Storm and Waledac botnets.
3.1.3 Routing-Table Crawling
In architectures that allow participating nodes to ask one-another for routing-table
data or identities of peers in other various formats, enumeration can occur by me-
thodically querying nodes within the network, requesting data which contains peer
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identities. This enumeration method can be used in architectures with established
peer-to-peer protocols traditionally used in benign networks (such as Overnet) as well
as custom protocols specific to individual botnets.
As a general rule, diversity should be stressed when requesting routing-table or
other peer-identity data. As bot node partitioning may occur in botnet design, where
any given node is not omniscient, or aware of the existence of all other nodes within the
network, repeatedly querying a single node would yield only addresses for a subset of
the total population. Thus, as a general methodology, enumeration by this method
should occur by first querying a node, then querying any nodes returned for their
peer-lists. Any new nodes discovered in each peer-list request should also be queried.
When the known addresses of bot nodes have been queried, the process should be
repeated ad infinitum. As partitioning still may occur based on query locality, peer-
list requests should originate from a diverse range of IP addresses if possible. The
general methodology for this technique is shown in Figure 1.
The main limitation of this technique is the need for knowledge of botnet-specific
protocols when custom communication schemes are employed. Means of obtaining
identity information for other peers must be determined prior to network enumera-
tion. Accordingly, tools written to “crawl” a given botnet generally must be modified
for other newly discovered botnets, and in some cases, different variants of the same
botnets due to evolving protocols. The short life-cycles for botnets and their commu-
nication protocols exacerbates this limitation. A second potential limitation exists
when crawling algorithms are developed to be overly aggressive, revealing the enu-
meration activity to the botnet operators.
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Figure 1: A general methodology for enumerating nodes in a botnet with peer-identity
retrieval mechanisms. After generating a list of nodes through a bootstrapping pro-
cess, bot nodes are queried repeatedly for information about other peers. Multi-
threaded crawling can occur when traversal lists are divided and distributed. All
known nodes may be queried during each crawl cycle, or undesirable nodes may be
filtered out using heuristics based on availability and perceived legitimacy.
When crawling algorithms are well-designed, where protocols and other bot behav-
iors are precisely emulated and use a query rate which is at or below that of legitimate
bot nodes, this enumeration strategy can enjoy respectable stealth. A second benefit
of this method is the likelihood of obtaining identifying information for nodes beyond
IP addresses. Node IDs or hashes may also be discovered along with IP addresses,
providing a means to identify unique nodes despite Internet volatility (DHCP churn)
and the presence of NAT devices.
Botnet coverage for this enumeration method is a function of time, query rate
and returned peer count. Like other enumeration strategies, coverage provided by
network crawling can be limited by architectural characteristics such as partitioning.
For example, crawling Waledac only reveals nodes in a single tier in the architecture,
as the other tiers do not participate in the peer-to-peer communication. The results
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from the deployment of a network crawler in the Waledac botnet is presented in
Chapter 5.
3.1.4 Fast-Flux DNS Exploitation
A brief discussion of fast-flux DNS is warranted in this study, as it is a relatively
new technology and understanding how it functions and is deployled within botnets
is critical to our enumeration efforts. Domains in single-flux fast-flux DNS systems
are designed to resolve to a rapidly changing set of IP addresses. In botnets, bot
nodes register their IP addresses for domain A records with short TTL values. In
double-flux systems, nodes register and register themselves as NS records for a DNS
zone.
In botnets, a select subset of the participating nodes can be used in fast-flux DNS
schemes. In this role, these systems are used as a distributed hosting environment
for botnet data, such as binaries or spam-campaign information. Nodes participating
in the fast-flux network can either host content directly or forward requests to other
computers providing data hosting services. As each node in the fast-flux scheme is
capable of delivering content to requesting nodes, considerable resilience is provided.
Obfuscation can also be provided by these fast-flux systems. The opaque fast-flux
layer can occlude the existence of systems which actually host data as they act as
proxies.
Traditional “takedown” efforts which target a single server associated with a do-
main are no longer effective, as the number of A-records for a fast-flux domain are
abound. Moreover, for each resolution attempt, not all A-records associated with a
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fast-flux domain (for its lifetime) are returned. Take-down attempts for the large and
nebulous set of addresses is, as a result, quite difficult.
By exploiting the fast-flux DNS used by botnets, node enumeration is possible.
Specifically, domain-names associated with botnets can be repeatedly resolved. IP
addresses in returned A-records can then be used as DNS servers themselves in further
domain resolution. With short TTL values for fast-flux domain A-records, enumera-
tion can occur rapidly.
The main advantage of this enumeration technique is the ability to enumerate
without intimate and precise knowledge of botnet communication protocols. Only
the fast-flux domain name(s) associated with a botnet are needed for enumeration to
begin. Enumeration with a short lead-time is therefore possible. Further, this node-
discovery method is considerably stealthy, as enumeration is simply an exploitation of
an external botnet service. The botmaster intends for systems outside of the botnet
to be able to resolve fast-flux domains and discover participating hosts to allow data
retrieval from nodes or bootstrapping. This service, as a result, can generally be
exploited without fear of alerting a botnet operator.
Limitations of this node discovery method include the inability to discover nodes
not participating in the fast-flux scheme and the lack of desirable identifying infor-
mation given in domain resolution beyond simple IP addresses. In our research we
have found that nodes participating in botnet fast-flux schemes do not constitute a
majority of the total population. The lack of identifying information such as peer
hashes is also unfortunate, given the potential for false-positives in mitigation and
significant distortion in population estimation.
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Coverage for this technique is a function of time, domain resolution rate, TTL
values for A-records, and the percentage of total population participating in the fast-
flux DNS scheme. Partitioning can affect coverage also, if multiple domains are used
and a given domain only resolves to a fraction of the nodes in the complete fast-flux
scheme. In Chapter 5, this efficacy of this method, and its coverage is compared to a
network crawler for the Waledac botnet.
3.1.5 DNS Sinkholes
Our final two enumeration techniques proposed in this study originated during our
research on the Confiker worm and its associated botnet. While much of the botnet
architecture used by this malware variant is nebulous, two facets of its operations
allow researchers to enumerate its participating systems.
For current data discovery, Conficker first utilizes a hard-coded algorithm to gener-
ate numerous domain names based on dates and then sends queries to the IP addresses
associated with these domain names. These domains, which appear random, are reg-
istered by the authors of this malware prior to their appearance in output of the
domain-generator algorithm.
Based on this behavior, it is possible for malware researchers to register these do-
mains yet further in advance, prior to their registration by the malware authors.
Monitoring systems may then be deployed with the IP addresses of the A-records of
these domains, and inbound traffic may be logged. As the domains generated by the
Conficker algorithm are considerably awkward in terms of composition (neither pro-
nounceable nor originating in any modern languages), one can make the assumption
18
that data-requests inbound to the systems associated with those domains do indeed
originate from systems infected with Conficker. The domain names were likely not
accidentally typed by a user attempting to navigate to a website or request other
non-malicious Internet-based services. With this monitoring, enumeration can occur.
The primary advantage of this technique is the ability to capture all communication
intended for hosts associated with bot domains without knowledge of botnet protocol
details. Only knowledge of botnet domains is needed. This would constitute either a
static set of domains or possession of the algorithm used to generate pseudo-random
domains. A limitation is a potentially slow discovery rate given unpredictable sinkhole
contact events, which would be dependent on botnet communication schemes.
Botnet coverage provided by this technique is a function of time, the percentage of
total domains “monitored” out of all potential domains, and inbound traffic rates.
3.1.6 Darkspace Monitoring
A second enumeration technique which arose during our study of Conficker is based
on the worm’s use of random Internet scans in IPv4 address space. The scanning logic
in Confiker does not exclude IPv4 addresses which are unreachable, those falling
in darkspace ranges. By deploying monitoring systems designed to receive traffic
destined to addresses in these ranges, we can observe Conficker activity. With time,
a significant number of computers infected with Conficker can be enumerated.
Though this enumeration method was crafted as an effective means of monitoring
Conficker, it is applicable to other forms of malware which scan Internet addresses
ranges, As peer-to-peer botnets can employ this behavior to discover nodes in purely
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decentralized architectures, we include darkspace monitoring as a general enumeration
technique for these types of advanced peer-to-peer botnets.
The primary advantage of this node discovery method is the provision of complete
stealth. A limitation is the need for large regions of darkspace to catch a significant
portion of botnet traffic. Coverage is a function of time, size of monitored IP address
space, bot scanning selection algorithms, and scanning rates. Coverage would also
depend on botnet architectural characteristics, where only nodes which engage in
scanning activities may be discovered.
3.1.7 Local Execution Monitoring
One of the most basic forms of botnet enumeration can occur through the moni-
toring of a honeypot or a system intentionally infected with a bot binary. This allows
one to discover nodes participating in a botnet via the bootstrapping process and
various types of information exchanges with other nodes.
The primary limitation of this method is difficulty in scalability and the limited
coverage provided. This method does not scale well, considering that a single infected
node likely does not interact with a significant percentage of the total bot population
during routine execution. It is also unlikely that a single node would otherwise be
aware of the total population, unless full peer lists are distributed to all participating
nodes, as per the case with the Mayday botnet. This technique can scale with multiple
infected hosts, but these systems would likely need to be virtualized. A benefit of this
method relates to the botnet communication protocol, in that it may be immediately
and precisely implemented without reverse-engineering or observation followed by
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programming.
The coverage provided by this technique is a function of time, population visible
by an individual node, and the number of infected systems deployed.
3.1.8 Sacrificial Attack Recipients
A rudimentary and potentially harmful method to enumerate nodes participating
in a botnet consists of intentionally provoking a denial of service attack on oneself
from a given botnet. Such an attack may be instigated by aggressively crawling a
botnet or otherwise performing intrusive activities which a botnet operator views as
undesirable tampering. This enumeration method related to darkspace monitoring
and sinkhole-based techniques.
This enumeration technique is exceedingly simplistic, but requires an adequate
network infrastructure to monitor and log inbound attack traffic. Additionally, it
is not guaranteed that systems participating in the attack belong to the botnet one
desires to enumerate. If botnet operators are not inclined to defend themselves with
their own resources (i.e. the nodes within their own botnets), other botnets may be
leased to perform distributed denial of service attacks. If a botnet one desires to
enumerate does, in fact, perform a denial of service attack, not all of the nodes in the
botnet may participate.
Further, such attacks may be difficult to incite, and the exposure provided by the
mechanisms to trigger the attacks may not be desirable. Finally, attacks performed
by botnets may not precisely target the systems you intended to become recipients of
these attacks. Routers and other systems tied to an organization a researcher belongs
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to may be affected.
Given the limitations of this enumeration method, coverage can be considered
fundamentally stochastic. However, coverage could be determined if one knew the
participation percentage of the the nodes in a botnet engaging in the attack, the
duration of the attack, and the rate of the attack.
3.2 Performance Evaluation Criteria
This section briefly describes evaluation criteria which can be used to evaluate the
performance of enumeration tools: accuracy, robustness, and stealthiness.
3.2.1 Accuracy
Accuracy in botnet enumeration refers to correctly distinguish bot nodes from
innocent network participants or fellow researchers. This is particularly important
when a botnet co-opts an existing innocuous peer-to-peer network. Accuracy may
also refer to the ability of a tool or methodology to enumerate infections rather than
IP addresses. When possible, unique identifiers specific to infected hosts should be
retained in addition to network information, as IP addresses are unreliable due to
DHCP churn and NAT devices.
3.2.2 Robustness
Botnet monitoring and measurement tools or methodologies should be robust and
resistant to protocol changes. The degree of robustness can result in an enumeration
method remaining effective for a single malware family experiencing protocol changes
or across numerous malware families with vastly different behavior. Regretfully, as
this study demonstrates, tools which emulate botnet protocols are the most effective
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in terms of completely enumerating a bot network are the least robust.
3.2.3 Stealthiness
Finally, stealthiness must be emphasized when designing enumeration tools, as
combative measures are often found in botnets where nodes which do not accurately
emulate legitimate infections are expunged or attacked. The absence of stealthiness
in tool design can also apply evolutionary pressure to malware, acting as a catalyz-
ing influences in malware design where additional defensive technologies might be
incorporated in future revisions of a malware family.
CHAPTER 4: ADVANCED BOTNET ARCHITECTURES
This chapter delineates two advanced botnets which have attained notoriety in the
information security community given their novel architectures, formidable defenses,
and unique daily operations. Achieving comprehensive understanding of these archi-
tectures is critical for the development and refinement of the node-discover techniques
described in this study. The Storm botnet is presented in Section 4.1. The Waledac
botnet is documented in Section 4.2.
4.1 The Storm Architecture
The Storm botnet, which was first discovered in January of 2007, utilized peer-to-
peer communication in its design, which marked a radical departure from centralized
IRC-based architectures. While Storm was not the first botnet to employ a partially
decentralized design, it was perhaps the most successful to date, given its estimated
size, spam-output, and longevity. Despite its unique architecture, the behavior of
Storm as a botnet is similar to that seen in more familiar botnet topologies. Through
its life, the botnets was used for the distribution of spam emails and distributed
denial of service attacks against a variety of targets, most commonly spam blacklisting
services and anti-malware researchers [32, 14].
While Storm was initially entirely peer-to-peer based, a tiered topology was later
introduced, with only the lower three layers engaging in a Distributed Hash Table
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(DHT) based peer-to-peer communication scheme. This final hybrid architecture
is shown in Figure 2. The vernacular used to describe the layers of this network
was originally proposed by Stewart [33]. This bodysection describes the experiments
and research conducted to discern the botnet’s structure and behavior followed by a
delineation of it’s communication protocol.
Overnet
Subnodes
Supernodes
Subcontrollers
Top-Level
C&C
Master Proxy
Figure 2: The Storm botnet architecture. A hybrid architecture featuring DHT-based
P2P communication with an overall tiered structure.
4.1.1 Analysis Methodology
The structure and behavior of the Storm botnet were partly discovered by inten-
tionally infecting four computers running Windows XP SP2 using Storm binaries.
These are referred to these as bare-metal systems, as the execution environment was
native and not virtualized. Possible detection of VMWare components by Storm bi-
naries influences this decision. Two of these systems resided in a university network
and two were connected using a residential ISP.
A Linux-based server, acting as a bridge, was been placed between these machines
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and the Internet allowed for the capture of incoming and outgoing traffic as well as
blocking of certain types of malicious traffic (e.g., SMTP used in bot email spam-
ming). In some instances, malicious traffic may be redirected to a sink-hole. In the
research presented in this dissertation, experiments were designed to avoid signifi-
cantly contributing to the malicious output of this botnet.
Throughout the experiment, secondary injection updates, including adaptation to
a new XOR encrypted communication channel, occurred without issue. The network
traffic generated by the bare-metal honeypots running real Storm binaries provides
a ground-truth for the botnet’s activities. Unfortunately, this does not allow for the
discovery and analysis of systems deployed by the botnet operator for command and
control functions.
Perceived functionality and behaviors viewed in traffic were confirmed and more
extensively explored through the reverse-engineering of Storm binaries. This also
provided a means to discover the bot’s hash-generation algorithm, encryption keys,
and other behavior that could not be discerned through non-static analysis techniques.
4.1.2 Communication Protocol
Storm’s communication protocol used an implementation of Overnet. Thus, this
section briefly describes the functionality of the original Overnet protocol, then de-
lineates the modifications used within Storm.
4.1.2.1 Overnet
Initial exploration of network traces from Storm binaries indicated the use of the
Kademlia protocol and participation in the Overnet file-sharing network. Overnet
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was originally designed for file sharing and implements the Kademlia protocol [21].
The network uses Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) to index files and facilitate searches.
Within this network there is no hierarchy. Each node participates equally in rout-
ing search traffic and possesses an arbitrarily generated 128-bit identifier. A ring
architecture is essentially formed which encompasses the complete ID key-space.
The DHT interface allows a user to publish [key, value] bindings, where keys
are constrained to the ID-space within the network and values are arbitrary strings.
Searches are performed by computing the cryptographic hash (MD4 ) of a keyword;
this hash is bound to the cryptographic hash of a file, which is in turn bound to a
string containing metadata about the file. When joining the network peers publish
information about files they own. Other peers determined to be close in terms of key-
space to the hash of the file are tasked with indexing this data, which includes the
name, length, and the IP addresses of peers that posses those files. In this network
“close” does not refer to physical proximity but rather distance as calculated by a
bitwise XOR of two hash IDs.
Each node in the network also maintains a large list of neighboring peers which
effectively functions as the node’s routing table. A Searches for a given key κ are
accomplished using “iterative prefix matching.” Starting from the routing table, the
peer repeatedly asks the α = 3 nodes it knows with IDs closest to κ for their α nodes
closest to κ, which are then added to the list of known peers, until it finds a replica
root, or a node closest to the desired key. These nodes may be found with logarithmic
efficiency.
The types of messages in the Overnet protocol are delineated in Appendix A.2.2.
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4.1.2.2 Storm Protocol
Storm originally co-opted Overnet from January to October of 2007, and connected
to this network used the same ID space, message types, and semantics as legitimate
Overnet clients. From October 2007 until the botnet’s demise in late 2008, however,
Storm bots joined an “encrypted” network that follows the same set of protocols
as the Overnet but encrypts packets at the application level using a simple XOR
cipher with a 320-bit key. Since the packets were encrypted, this network no longer
interacted with Overnet. While this allowed Storm nodes to longer be tasked with
routing traffic associated with legitimate peer-to-peer network activity in Overnet, it
also facilitated the accurate enumeration of infected nodes, as the newer encrypted
network contained only legitimate Storm nodes and researchers.
Several idiosyncrasies exist in the Storm implementation of the Overnet protocol
which distinguish it from legitimate P2P traffic. The number of search messages sent
by a legitimate client is 3 for any given search. In Storm, however, 20 were observed.
This was most likely an attempt by the bot to increase the odds and speed of search
results. Publish messages sent by the bot also did not contain any search bindings.
Typically, publish messages contain 2 hashes in addition to strings. This created
Storm publish packets which were fixed at 36 bytes.
4.1.2.3 Network Bootstrapping and Locating Data
A bot began by sending OvernetPublicize messages to IP addresses and ports hard-
coded in the binary in order to find a live node participating in the network. Upon
receiving an OvernetPublicizeAck, an incoming bot continued to talk to this node
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to build up a large number of IP addresses in its routing table. While these peer
identities were stored in memory, periodically, a small number of peer IP addresses
were also written to disk in spooldr.ini. Peer data in this file was formatted as <32
CharacterHashID>=<8CharacterIPAddress><4CharacterPort>00, with the IP
address and port in a hexadecimal format. An excerpt of a Storm bootstrap file is
shown in Figure 3. When a bot has a sufficiently large number of routing table entries,
it uses OvernetPublicize messages and performs searches for its own ID to maintain
a list of active peers.
[config]
ID=930892018
[local]
uport=32932
[peers]
0000CE0DFF15B0147F656014084C9E1F=7AA517D0308200
0100DF1E00362069A4001B189D259177=5D50A6A76E9D00
0200BC6FD7649D3535182302EC1DC551=62C7ADA5184400
0300D0245D135C365950A24C793F8B1C=C4C026C00D6D00
...
...
Figure 3: Excerpt from a sample Storm bootstrap file.
To locate data in the network a bot uses iterative parallel routing by repeatedly
sending OvernetSearch messages to get closer to a target hash. In each hop, it sends 20
OvernetSearch messages and, upon receiving sufficient OvernetSearchReply messages,
it chooses another 20 nodes closer to a key. When the search is routed to a potential
root node, a OvernetGetSearchResults request is sent. The OvernetSearchResults
messages sent as a response initially contained information pertinent to malicious
campaigns, such as sending spam or participating in denial of service attacks. In
later versions of the botnet, this search functionality served to help a bot locate IP
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addresses of nodes in the hierarchical architecture.
Target hashes can be one of 32 unique strings generated daily. The hash-generation
algorithm is hard-coded in each bot binary, and uses the current data and a random
integer between 0 and 31 as input. To ensure that the correct hashes are being
generated, Storm infections perform an NTP query to synchronize the local system
clock with the correct date. To monitor the botnet, the activity associated with these
hashes can be recorded.
4.1.3 Tiered Structure
In early versions of Storm, infected hosts participated equally in the malicious out-
put of the botnet, primarily spam dispersion, but following the introduction of the
tiered structure to the network, bots were relegated to two discrete layers which distin-
guished their roles. These layers have been described as Subnodes and Supernodes [33]
or alternatively Worker bots and Proxy bots [14]. Supernodes were externally avail-
able, while nodes behind NAT or firewall devices became Subnodes. This decision
was made after a test to determine if a node could be reached externally.
Supernodes were activated when they received an RSA-encrypted packet known as
a “Breath of Life.” These packets were sent by nodes higher in the botnet hierarchy
which have been called Subcontrollers [33] and contained a lists of these same hosts
which allowed the recipient of the BoL packet to act as proxies for the botmaster
systems. Communication between Subnodes and Supernodes was HTTP-based and
zlib [28] compressed.
At least one additional tier existed above these layers which provided tasks to the
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botnet and logged status reports. Servers residing in tiers above the layers populated
with infected-hosts in Storm were deployed by the operators of the botnet and could
not be inspected to confirm their existence or discern their configurations.
4.1.4 Infected-Host Activities
Supernodes, which were publicly accessible, were used in the botnet’s HTTP proxy
system and fast-flux DNS scheme. These nodes listened for HTTP traffic on port 80,
specifically requests for bot binaries generated when Internet users clicked on URLs
in emails distributed during malware propagation campaigns. Requests for these
binaries were forwarded up to the Subcontroller tier, which returned the requested
binary. It is unknown whether hosts in the Subcontrollers tier actually hosted these
binaries or if additional request forwarding was performed. Once a Supernode receives
a binary, it responds to the original binary request. From a user’s perspective, the
requested binary appears to be hosted on the Supernode. By computing MD5 hash
sums for gathered binaries, it was observed that these executables were not static.
Though the functionality of these binaries is consistent, their MD5 signatures change
every 10 minutes.
Subnodes, the bots in the lowest layer of the hierarchical architecture, were tasked
with sending spam and participating in denial of service attacks. Spam emails were
only sent, however, if an initial test to see if the bot can connect to an external
SMTP server was successful. Subnodes communicate through Supernodes, which
are discovered using the Overnet search process described above. Supernodes act as
intermediaries (proxies) between the Subnodes and Subcontrollers. As the Subnodes
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in the network request spam campaign data, this can be considered a pull rather than
push command and control scheme.
Subnodes requested three types of data over TCP prior to participating in the spam
distribution campaign: templates, raw-text dictionaries, and a list of email addresses
to be used as mail recipients. The raw-text dictionaries were used to complete fields
in the templates and produce more dynamic spam less likely to be blocked by filters
in-transit. This can be referred to as spam polymorphism. After unique messages are
crafted for each recipient in the delivery list, Subnodes send these messages to the
servers found using the MX records. After completing the spam workloads, Subnodes
would send detailed statistics related to delivery success back to the botmaster via
Supernodes.
4.1.5 Demise
The Storm botnet thrived from January 2007 until September 2008 when it inex-
plicably stopped functioning. Numerous mitigation efforts from several universities
and private-sector companies were ongoing at the time, but it is unknown whether
the botnet met its end due to that activity or intentional destruction by the botnet
operator(s). The emergence of a new, highly similar botnet, however, in December of
2008 suggests the latter of these two possibilities may be true. Assuming the botnets
are related, which this research proposes, it is probable that Waledac was designed
as a replacement.
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4.2 The Waledac Architecture
Featuring a highly similar topology to Storm, the Waledac botnet emerged in late
2008. Waledac also employes a composite architecture which blends peer-to-peer
communication with an overall tiered structure. The binaries which infected hosts and
formed this botnet were spread via email. The botnet primarily functioned to send
spam and harvest sensitive data from bot participants. This chapter documents this
botnet’s structure, communication protocol, malicious output, and the deployment
specifics of the command and control servers.
4.2.1 Layers in the Tiered Topology
The determination of Waledac’s structure and many of its behaviors was achieved
through reverse engineering of bot binaries, binary execution, and live network ex-
ploration. Discovering the configuration and behavior of the nebulous systems de-
ployed by the botmaster required cooperation of the ISPs hosting these systems. Two
ISPs in the Netherlands provided network traces and file-system artifacts from nodes
in Waledac’s top two tiers. The botnet’s communication protocol was determined
through reverse-engineering and analysis of network traffic from Waledac-infected
hosts.
While active, the Waledac botnet was composed of four tiers, each containing
nodes with clearly defined roles. Infected hosts were relegated to the lower two tiers,
while systems deployed by the operators of the botnet were hosted in the top two
layers. This topology is shown in Figure 4. Unlike Storm, a complex peer network
which comprises multiple tiers is not found; peer-to-peer communication is relegated
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to a single tier. Comparatively, Waledac is more refined and simple, the result of a
devolutionary process.
UTS
Tier
TSL 
Tier
Repeater
Tier
Spammer
Tier
Botmaster-Owned
Infrastructure
Infected
Hosts
1
2
3
4
Figure 4: The hierarchical topology of Waledac. Peer-to-peer communication is rele-
gated to a single tier.
4.2.1.1 Tier 1: UTS
The highest layer in Waledac contained a single node throughout its lifetime, using
the IP address 85.17.143.66. This system, hosted in the Netherlands, is referred to as
the UTS, or Upper Tier Server. This system functioned as the primary C&C server
for the botnet, performing the following functions:
• Task Storage
• Bootstrap List Hosting
• Binary Hosting (For Spam and Propagation Campaigns)
• Infected Host Monitoring, Heath Tests / Auditing
• Botnet Log Repository
• Interface for Affiliates
By analyzing network traces from this system, its operating system could be de-
termined. As part of the request to the yum repository found in Linux distribution
based on Red Hat, yum sent out a XML request containing the operating system and
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platform. The UTS server under observation sent a standard HTTP request contain-
ing GET /pub/centos/5.3/os/x86 64/repodata/repomd.xml. This indicates that
the UTS server was based on CentOS 5.3 running on a 64-bit platform.
By inspecting fragments of file-system data, it was determined that this server used
97 PHP files, 75 bash scripts, and numerous flat text files to perform its daily opera-
tions. A central database for configuration data, such as Oracle or MySQL was not
employed. The main PHP files which interfaces with the lower tiers of the network is
called main.php. This script responded to queries from infected-hosts in the network
and dispatched an appropriate handler for the type of request. Automated tasks on
the server were performed with while 1 loops and sleep commands rather than cron
jobs.
To interact with this server, the botnet operator relied on a command-line interface.
A graphical interface does exist but is not interactive; it provides visualization for
botnet statistics using RRD. This monitoring interface is described in Section 4.2.6.
The UTS node periodically interacted with several 3rd-party servers external to
Waledac’s tiered topology. These external servers provided binary repacking services,
URL data for spamming campaigns, and RogueAV software to be installed on infected
hosts. These activities are described in Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5.
4.2.1.2 Tier 2: TSL
The TSL layer, also containing systems deployed by the botnet operators, is the
last victim exposed tier and the first obfuscated tier in the Waledac infrastructure.
This layer is named after the network’s distribution of the identities of these systems
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in a format dubbed ”The Server List.”
From the perspective of nodes below it, this tier functions as a simple obfuscation
layer, occluding the location and existence of the UTS tier. Forensic analysis of
these systems, however, reveals that the TSL tier also plays a role in the botnet’s
production of spam. The use of this tier in Waledac’s malicious output is discussed in
section 4.2.4. While the UTS layer contained only a single node, the TSL hosted, at
a given time, between 5 and 7 servers. These severs constantly revolved through the
botnet’s lifetime, as the botnet operator would bring new servers online when TSL
systems were disabled by their ISPs.
By examining the Kickstart configuration file, it was determined that these servers
contain an absolutely minimal base image install (referred to in the configuration as
simply @core). This stripped down install reduces the amount of work the botmaster
must do to secure the server when removing unnecessary services.
Inspecting the .bash history file for each of the TSL images, it was possible to
determine the approximate order in which services were installed and executed during
the creation of the TSL server by the botmaster. Following the installation of mc, the
botmaster installed several standard services and applications such as the Network
Time Protocol (ntp) daemon, the DNS server BIND, PHP, OpenVPN, BZip2, and
the nginx [38] proxy.
The botmaster used two different approaches for obtaining the necessary services
and applications to bring a TSL online. The first approach relied on the standard
yum application. This approach allowed the botmaster to use the database of precom-
piled applications available in the CentOS software repository. The second approach,
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the approach most heavily relied upon, involved having a prepackaged collection of
software installation archives that require individual installation and compilation. As
a defensive mechanism intended to make data forensics more difficult should a TSL
system become captured, a custom script was found on this system which deleted
incriminating logs in /var/log/ every hour.
/root/pack:
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root   18 Jul 10 09:13 PERSONAL_IPTABLES!
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root  147 Jul 23 09:20 clean_log.sh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root  185 Dec 15  2008 do.sh
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root   41 Dec 15  2008 i18n
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 3689 Jul 23 09:20 iptables
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4123 Dec 17  2008 nginx.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root   57 Dec 15  2008 rc.local
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root   81 Dec 22  2008 screen.sh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root   84 Dec 15  2008 time.sh
/root/src:
-rw-r--r--  1 root root   6724683 Jun 12 02:23 bind-9.6.1.tar.gz
-rw-r--r--  1 root root    895713 Jun 15 19:59 dante-1.1.19.tar.gz
-rw-r--r--  1 root root    555631 Jun 23 21:40 eaccelerator-0.9.5.3.tar.bz2
-rw-r--r--  1 root root    414870 Jun 13 16:45 htop-0.8.1.tar.gz
-rw-r--r--  1 root root    428061 Jun 23 14:05 htop-0.8.3.tar.gz
-rw-r--r--  1 root root    524667 Nov 27  2008 nginx-0.6.34.tar.gz
-rw-r--r--  1 root root    593586 May 25 10:00 nginx-0.7.59.tar.gz
-rw-r--r--  1 root root    595557 Jul 13 11:48 nginx-0.8.5.tar.gz
-rw-r--r--  1 root root   1168513 Sep  5  2008 pcre-7.8.tar.gz
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  11433921 Jun 17 12:43 php-5.2.10.tar.gz
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  12427411 Jun 13 16:45 php-5.2.8.tar.gz
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  13239065 Jun 29 21:36 php-5.3.0.tar.gz
-rw-r--r--  1 root root    327057 Jun 23 21:40 proxychains-3.1.tar.gz
-rw-r--r--  1 root root     83928 Jun 16 09:52 tsocks-1.8beta5.tar.gz
Figure 5: TSL pack and src directories as observed on a TSL server. These directories
contain the necessary services and configuration files to deploy a TSL server.
The network identities of TSL systems are encrypted and distributed to nodes in
the next layer down, Repeaters, shortly after these systems join the botnet. While
the peer-lists the Repeater nodes exchange are unauthenticated, the list of TSL IP
addresses is signed using a public/private key signature.
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4.2.1.3 Tier 3: Repeater
The Repeater tier contains systems infected with Waledac binaries which feature
non-private IP addresses, and has the distinction of being the highest tier which con-
tains infected-hosts and the only tier which uses peer-to-peer routing. This tier is
similar to the Supernode layer in the Storm botnet. Nodes in the Repeater tier are
aware of one another as the result of the exchange of XML-formatted peer lists. The
specifics of this peer communication are discussed in Section 4.2.3.3. Peer lists are
initially seeded by querying a fast-flux domain, which points to a Repeater node.
Repeater nodes can serve as HTTP proxies, SOCKS proxies, and DNS servers, par-
ticipating in the fast-flux botnet infrastructure. These nodes also harvest local emails
and use a library to sniff network traffic.
When sending data to the C&C server, Repeaters communicate through other
Repeaters. In terms of routing, data is sent laterally to a neighboring Repeater node
before it is sent up. Spammer nodes in the tier immediately below this layer also rely
on Repeaters to send data to the UTS tier. Given that they are publicly accessible
and are required for routing data, Repeater nodes are considerable more valuable
than the infected hosts in the Spammer tier.
4.2.1.4 Tier 4: Spammer
The lowest layer in Waledac is populated with Spammers, named after their primary
functionality and the use of S in Waledac’s own C&C logs. Incoming nodes are
relegated to this tier when the possess private IP addresses as dictated by the RFC
1918 [27] specifications. Nodes in this tier sent unauthenticated spam, participated in
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denial-of-service attacks, and harvested local sensitive network and file-system data.
Spammers communicated through Repeaters for all types of communication.
A pcap library was used to sniff local network traffic, looking for SMTP creden-
tials. The file-system harvesting activity searched for email addresses, locating them
by looking for the ‘@’ character, then scanning backwards until the first non-printable
ASCII character was reached, followed by a forward search using the same method-
ology. A limit of 256 characters is is used for both searches. Top Level Domains
(TLDs) less than 2 characters and usernames less than 4 characters were rejected.
Discovered address were stored internally for later transmission to the UTS. Probing
of the UTS, described in Section 4.2.6 revealed 14 GB of email addresses. Only files
with certain extensions were scanned. The email harvesting routine ignored files with
the following extensions: avi, mov, wmv, mp3, wave, wav, wma, ogg, vob, jpg, jpeg,
gif, bmp, exe, dll, ocx, class, msi, zip, rar, jar, hxw, hxh, hxn, and hxd.
4.2.2 Trans-Tier Command Marshaling
By default, the ngnix.conf file, seen in Figure 6, contains a simple set of proxy
transformations. The primary function of the proxy transformations is the translation
of requests from the public side of the TSL tier to a format acceptable to the higher
tiers of the botnet. These transformations focus primarily on ensuring that the request
originated from within the Repeater tier of the botnet, as indicated by the user-agent
field of the HTTP request containing the string LMK. With three exceptions (/pr/,
/lm/, and /tds/), the proxy will return a HTTP 404 error code if the user-agent
does not contain the LMK substring. This effectively weeds out non-Repeater tier
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originating requests while at the same time preventing additional work for the UTS
tier.
The three exceptions to the LMK rule relate to traffic originating from outside of the
Repeater tier. These exceptions establish the fact that what was originally considered
a simple proxy tier is actually an entry point for third party access. The exceptions
allow third party actors (such as affiliates) to interface with the Waledac botnet in or-
der to facilitate the underground commerce the Waledac botnet generates. The /pr/
exception allows the botmaster to transfer content between the botmaster-controlled
tiers (TSL and UTS) without significant overhead and provides a means for phish-
ing webpages to serve content such as graphics and executables. This data revealed
in this configuration file allowed for the direct interaction with the UTS in probing
experiments, and the retrieval of back-end data, including email addresses, raw log
files, and other various configuration files.
4.2.3 Communication Protocol
This section describes the nuances of Waledac’s communication protocol, deter-
mined through reverse-engineering of bot binaries and the analysis of network traffic
from Spammer and Repeater nodes, which were run in a virtual environment through-
out Waledac’s lifetime (December 2008 - February 2010).
4.2.3.1 Bootstrapping
A new infection joining the Waledac network relies on two mechanisms to discover
active nodes already participating in the botnet. First, a new infection utilized a
hardcoded list of IP addresses. Should the incoming node fail to find an active node
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location /mr.txt {     
proxy_pass http://85.x.x.x/lm/data/hosting/mr.txt;
proxy_redirect off;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
}
location /pr/ {     
proxy_pass http://85.x.x.x/lm/data/hosting/partnerka/;
proxy_redirect off;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
}
location /tds/ {     
proxy_pass http://{removed}.name/tds/;
proxy_redirect off;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header User-Agent $http_user_agent;
proxy_set_header Referer $http_referer;
proxy_pass_header Client-Host;
}
location / {     
if ($http_user_agent !~ (.+)LMK$) {
error_page  403 404 500 502 503 504 /404.html;
return 404;
}
proxy_pass http://85.x.x.x/lm/data/hosting/;
proxy_redirect off;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
}        
location ~ ^/[a-z]*\.(png|htm)$ {
if ($http_user_agent !~ (.+)LMK$) {
error_page  403 404 500 502 503 504 /404.html;
return 404;
}
rewrite ^/[a-z]*\.(png|htm)$ /lm/main.php last;
}
location /lm/ {
if ($http_user_agent !~ (.+)LMK$) {
return 404;
error_page  403 404 500 502 503 504  /404.html;    
}
proxy_pass http://85.x.x.x/lm/;
proxy_redirect off;     
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
}
Figure 6: The default TSL nginx.conf configuration for the TSL servers defines the
translation of HTTP requests from the public interface of the TSL to the next tier in
the hierarchy (UTS). This configuration specifies how Repeater nodes must conform
to a specific user-agent in order to pass traffic through the TSL tier.
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in that list, a hardcoded URL in the botnet’s fast-flux scheme was used, as resolving
this domain returned IP addresses of bot nodes. After the new bot discovered a live
node, it sent it a copy of a unique certificate generated at runtime. This certificate was
forwarded to the UTS server, which used it to encrypt the botnet’s current private
encryption key. This encrypted key was then returned to the new bot. This new
infection was then capable of participating in the botnet.
4.2.3.2 Commands and Encoding Scheme
Waledac used 5 different methods to encode data, shown in Table 1. This table
documents the command types, purpose, and encryption schemes used. Note that
most encoding methods involve bzip2 compression and AES encryption with one of
three unique keys. All types of communication are Base64 encoded prior to being
transmitted.
Table 1: Waledac Encoding Schemes
Comm.
Type Used For Encoding Transform
1 Node List Updating via .php Page Base64(AES.key2(XML))
2 “GetKey” Information Exchange Base64({header}{AES.key2(BZip2(XML))})
3 Commands 1-7 Base64({header}{AES.key0(BZip2(XML))})
4 Node List Updating using “X-
Request-Kind-Code: nodes” HTTP
Request
Base64(AES.key1(BZip2(XML)))
5 TSL List Updating using “X-
Request-Kind-Code: servers”
HTTP Request
Base64({header}{RSA/SHA1 Sig-
nature} {header} {Timestamp}
{Entry Count} {IP:Port Pairs})
4.2.3.3 Peer-to-Peer Communication
Nodes in the Repeater layer were aware of one another due to the presence of XML-
formatted peer lists. In early versions of the network, these were exchanged between
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Repeater nodes and included nodes each peer was aware of. In later versions, however,
these lists originated from the UTS and were less dynamic. The format of these peer
lists is reproduced below.
<lm><localtime>EPOCHTIME</localtime><nodes>
<node ip="IP" port="80" time="EPOCHTIME">HASHID</node>
<node ip="IP" port="80" time="EPOCHTIME">HASHID</node>
...
<node ip="IP" port="80" time="EPOCHTIME">HASHID</node>
</nodes></lm>
4.2.3.4 Hash ID Generation
Waledac hash IDs are hexadecimal strings ranging from 30 to 44 characters in
length. This length varied over time through different version of binaries. The hash
generation algorithm used by Waledac’s infected hosts produces sufficiently random
node IDs, but does small posses flaws.
The rand() function, reproduced below, is initialized with a call to srand(), and is
seeded with the tickcount(). The TickCount [22] function returns a 32-bit value rep-
resenting the number of milliseconds that have elapsed since a computer was booted.
The resolution of this 8-byte value is usually between 10 and 16 millimeters, and is
limited to 49.7 days. When this limit is reached the value wraps to 0. The resolution
of this counter has, according to MSDN, only a resolution of 10 to 16 milliseconds
or 228 bits. While a hash ID is generated as an array of integers, it is converted to
an array of characters. A predictable flaw exists as a result of this conversion, where
every 3rd character falls in the [0..7] range. As a result, hash collisions are a remote
possibility.
rand()
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tiddata = getptd();
newseed = 0x343FD * tiddata-> holdrand + 0x269EC3;
tiddata-> holdrand = newseed;
return (newseed >> 16) & 0x7FFF;
These hash IDs are stored locally in non-volatile memory in the registry branch
HKCU/Software/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/ in the key MyID. These val-
ues are persistent across system reboots and binary updates, allowing them to function
as true unique identifiers. These hash IDs are only generated by the malware when
the registry key is not found.
4.2.4 Automated Administrative Activity
This section documents the Waledac’s automated activities mostly initiated by the
systems deployed bot the operator(s) of the botnet. The node-auditing techniques,
third-party binary repacking services, and fast-flux DNS operations are discussed.
4.2.4.1 Node Auditing
The Waledac botnet is open to observation as this document and others related
to this topic have shown [30, 31, 5, 34]. The botnet has limited protection from
poisoning attacks at the Repeater tier. To monitor and prevent such attacks, the
botmaster uses the UTS as a self-auditing component to ensure that only legitimate
Waledac bots are introducing traffic into the botnet. Simulating the behavior of a
Waledac Repeater node is possible given the open XML format the botnet uses for
communication. Provided that the simulated Repeater node properly handles the
encryption and compression required to transmit the XML through the botnet, the
construction of a simulated Repeater node that appears to be a legitimate Repeater
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node is trivial. The Waledac botmaster has developed creative solutions to distinguish
simulated (illegitimate) Repeater nodes from real bots.
The first test performed by a UTS server when auditing a node can be called the
Executable Request Proxy (ERP) test. When developing a simulated node, it is
conceivable that the researcher would prevent the node from being used to propagate
Waledac or other malicious nodes. As such, the node would drop any request for
an executable by an outside (victim) entity. The ERP test plays against this fact
by having the UTS issue a request for a specific file named readme.exe. The UTS
will directly contact the node under audit with the URL /readme.exe. A real node
will pass this request to the TSL server which will in turn pass the request to the
UTS server. Therefore, it is possible for the UTS to track from start to finish the
request and reply for readme.exe. The contents of readme.exe consist of two bytes
which simulate the DOS header of a PE/COFF file, the letters MZ. A variation of the
ERP test is also performed randomly when the UTS requests readme.txt instead of
readme.exe. The reply to this variation of the ERP test is the string Hello. During
a two hour period, the observed UTS server issued 597 ERP tests.
The second test performed by a UTS server focuses on the DNS component of
a Repeater node. Since a simulated Repeater node would not necessarily need to
participate in the DNS portion of the Waledac fast-flux network, it is conceivable
that researchers would simply ignore DNS requests. To test for this possibility, the
botmaster introduced a new domain into the Waledac fast-flux configuration named
hellohello123.com in August of 2009. The domain currently does not have an associ-
ated name server and as such cannot be resolved though the .com Top Level Domain
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(TLD). The Domain Response (DR) test uses the fast-flux network configuration in
order to determine the validity of the audited node. The UTS issues a DNS lookup
for hellohello123.com by querying the node under review. Since hellohello123.com
is part of the fast-flux network configuration, a valid repeater would return one of
the predefined IP addresses from the configuration data. A simulated repeater would
potentially fail this test by either returning invalid information or not responding at
all. Therefore the DR test can identify invalid Repeater nodes based solely on their
response to a specific, non-resolvable domain query. The UTS issued 693 DR tests
during a two hour period of observation.
4.2.4.2 Third-Party Repacking
Waledac did not employ rootkits in order to hide from antivirus applications, but
rather it used a constantly changing set of packed binaries to avoid signature detec-
tion. There are approximately 50 known versions of Waledac in the wild, but there
are over 3200 different binaries for these 50 versions [37]. The Waledac binary is
routinely repacked resulting in the large number of binaries each with a unique MD5
hash (or signature). The frequency at which these binaries are repacked is exceedingly
high and requires automation. The UTS employed a third party service provider at
crypt.j-roger.com and cservice.j-roger.com to repack Waledac binaries. In order to
repack a binary, the UTS system sends a POST request to one of the two URLs
crypt.j-roger.com/api/apicrypt2/ {16 hexadecimal digit hash} or
cservice.j-roger.com/api/apicrypt2/ {16 hexadecimal digit hash}. Contained
within the POST is an action form detailing the specifics of the repacking request
46
along with the binary to pack in a modified version of Base64. Figure 7 illustrates
an example, pulled from the UTS network traces, of the POST payload sent by the
UTS during a request for a repack of a Waledac loader binary.
files={"0":{"filename":"loaders\/
gera.exe","filebody":"TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA….AAA=","packer_before":"none","pac
ker_after":"none","iconname":"","iconbody":""},"files_count":
1,"profiling":{"client_start_transmitting":1251448624}}
Figure 7: UTS requesting a binary repack.
On average, the packing service at j-roger.com returned a repacked binary in 4
seconds. This allows the UTS to repack multiple binaries in a very short period of
time. During a two hour period, Waledac was observed requesting (and receiving)
157 binaries through the j-roger.com service. When the service returns the binary to
the UTS, the server uses a similar format as the request as seen in Figure 8.
{"files":[{"systemid":"213555","filename":"loaders\/
gera.exe","filesize":"18944","packer_before":"none","packer_after":"none"
,"description":"","upload_status":true,"crypt_status":"true","crypt_times
tamp":"2009-08-28 
12:37:08","crypt_md5_hash":"6a8c37c99f5cae04818fcb95008c63ed","crypt_body
":"TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA…AAA="}],"files_count":1,"profiling":
{"server_after_receive":1251448624,"server_after_checking":
1251448624,"server_after_parsing":1251448624,"client_start_transmitting":
1251448624,"server_after_crypting":{"0-loaders\/gera.exe":
1251448628},"server_before_sending":1251448628}}
Figure 8: Reply from j-roger.com containing the repacked binary.
4.2.4.3 Fast-Flux DNS
The Repeater layer in the Waledac botnet participated in a fast-flux DNS scheme
managed by the UTS node. Using an automated script, the UTS sends updates
through the Repeater tier, functioning as a SOCKS proxy, to the xinnet master name
server for Waledac domains. The script pulls a list of active Repeater IP addresses
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and updates NS records accordingly. These fast-flux domains are used in spamming
and propagation campaigns. By using the SOCKS proxy layer within Waledac, the
UTS server does not reveal its location to the external DNS server.
4.2.5 Malicious Output
The Waledac botnet relied chiefly on spam dissemination for infected-host mon-
etization. Ultimately, the UTS tier is responsible for acquiring the information to
place in the spam campaigns. Evidence of this behavior is found in a series of re-
quests to the spam warehouse website at spamit.com [29]. The Spamit system is a
known clearinghouse for so-called Canadian Pharmacy websites. On multiple occa-
sions in a very short period of time (less than one hour) the UTS used the wget
application to query the Spamit website for new domains to enter into the current
spam campaign. The UTS queries the spamit.com server using a simple HTTP
GET request that takes the form of GET /export.php?aid={affliateID}&mode=
personal&design=blue&secure={hash token}. The request generates a simple list
of domain names such as http://offerled.com, http://toldtool.com and http://hourshine.com
with each domain name separated by a newline break. This information is dissemi-
nated downward into the botnet for use in different spamming campaigns.
A unique feature of this botnet was the presence of differentiated spam campaigns.
In addition to the more traditional method of using open mail relays or sending mail
directly, Waledac possessed the ability to send authenticated spam using SMTP-
AUTH. These campaigns can be referred to LQS (Low Quality Spam) and HQS
(High Quality Spam), respectively.
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The majority of Waledac’s spam was sent from the Spammer tier. This campaign
type was characterized by bulk spam with a higher probability of being blacklisted
due to the originating IP addresses being dynamically assigned (e.g. residential cable
modems or DSL services). The Spammer nodes that ultimately transmitted this type
of Low Quality Spam (LQS ) kept detailed statistics on if a particular piece of spam
from a particular campaign destined for a particular email address was successfully
transmitted. This operation is illustrated in 9.
       Spammer Cloud
Spam Target's 
SMTP Servers
       Repeater Cloud
UTS
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Figure 9: Waledac’s low-quality bulk spam generation model, where delivery success
is not of high importance. This is referred to as Low Quality Spam (LQS).
As LQS is likely to run into blacklists during mail dissemination, the operators of
this botnet developed a method of sending mail using legitimate email accounts with
their associated SMTP servers. Numerous tiers in the Waledac botnet are leveraged
to produce this type of mail. While the TSL tier has been described in prior research
as a simple proxy or obfuscation layer serving to hide the location and existence of
nodes above it, nodes in this tier also function as secondary command and control
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servers in the HQS campaigns.
The botmaster, as part of the initial deployment of a TSL server, installs a custom
PHP application called php mailer. This application is a simple bulk mailer that
is coupled with an open source package known as proxychains [2]. Equipped with a
collection of validated SMTP login credentials, the botmaster generates between 100
and 300 instances of php mailer. The bulk mailer connects to a cloud of proxy servers
via SOCKS5. These proxies in turn connect to the specified SMTP server via TCP
port 25. The php mailer application uses valid login credentials to authenticate with
the SMTP server before sending multiple spam emails from the victim’s account. The
result of this HQS scheme, shown in Figure 10 was spam with a higher probability of
successful delivery.
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Figure 10: Waledac supports the unique ability to send spam using stolen email cre-
dentials. This provides a high delivery success rate. This is referred to as High Quality
Spam (HQS). In the Low Quality Spam (LQS) campaigns, nodes in the Spammer tiers
send the more common type of unauthenticated spam.
50
4.2.6 Monitoring Interface
By carefully examining the nginx.conf file, a mechanism for interacting with the
UTS was discovered, which allowed for the HTTP-based retrieval of botnet logs and
the ability to observe graphs created with RRD-tool. This log-retrieval method is
shown in Figure 11. A log excerpt is shown in Figure 12. Four types of logs were
available: 1-first.txt, 2-notify.txt, 4-words.txt, and 6-httpstats.txt and
followed a similar format. The logs correspond with command types used by the
botnet when infected systems report-in or request data from the network. Common
fields include dates, timestamps, IP addresses of infected systems and intermediary
nodes (used in traffic forwarding), hash IDs, node types (Repeater of Spammer) and
affiliate IDs. Fields were delimited with space characters.

HTTP GET <tslIP>/lm/logs/<logType>
User-Agent="LMK"

TSL UTSClient





 

Figure 11: Retrieval method used to access logs stored on the main Waledac command
and control server.
In total, 5.1 GB of plain-text logs were collected from December 4th through the
22nd in 2009. These logs provide total coverage in terms of node enumeration, and
were used in later research pursing the relationships between network addresses and
unique infection IDs. It should be noted that spoofed network traffic can arrive at
the UTS node and, as a result, can be written to disk in these logs. This requires a
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moderate amount of knowledge on the botnet’s communication protocol, however, as
various correct encoding methods must be used.
04/12/2009  10:42:41  121.190.114.138   97.100.150.154  89.149.226.65   51  5e300d441c49064db74d4715de54b3  R  5.1.2600  sware51
04/12/2009  10:42:44  121.162.27.26     118.36.212.192  217.23.3.226    51  e33555107c4aff1f3e321a27f1599d  S  5.1.2600  sware51
04/12/2009  10:42:46  59.94.240.71      121.140.186.12  95.211.8.161    51  1c11313dbb59af3c4d597525a4430e  S  5.1.2600  sware51
04/12/2009  10:42:48  125.177.44.191    121.140.186.12  95.211.8.161    51  2a5c845c9862a4749964a2293f46ed  S  6.0.6002  sware51
04/12/2009  10:42:51  119.149.86.34     24.124.69.193   89.149.208.241  51  5e300d441c49064db74d4715de54b3  R  5.1.2600  sware51
04/12/2009  10:42:56  122.42.104.16     121.140.186.12  95.211.8.161    51  4342577bd239a71e06374062bc683d  S  5.1.2600  sware51
04/12/2009  10:43:00  203.78.118.6      93.177.154.174  89.149.208.241  51  612c1c60b675ba71a8199e166b272a  S  5.1.2600  sware51
04/12/2009  10:43:01  60.191.116.66     121.140.186.12  89.149.242.175  51  5964dd1c9602512e5934c366712152  S  5.1.2600  sware51
04/12/2009  10:43:05  94.96.220.126     97.100.150.154  217.23.3.226    51  46545e1ad05eb725f84a43096a304f  S  5.1.2600  sware51
04/12/2009  10:43:06  118.101.29.234    117.123.130.47  93.174.93.73    51  453e232af214bc666d222265dc6091  S  5.1.2600  sware51
04/12/2009  10:43:08  117.204.97.223    68.61.124.17    89.149.208.241  51  cc654a169351df313831600e7971ef  S  5.1.2600  sware51
Figure 12: Excerpt from 1-first.txt retrieved from the UTS node. The fields are
date, time (GMT+3), reporting node IP address, repeater address used in forwarding,
TSL address, node binary version, node hash ID, node operating mode (Spammer or
Repeater), Windows version, and affiliate ID string.
4.2.7 Business Model
The affiliate program, or partnerka used by Waledac is known internally as the
FairMoney system. Details regarding FairMoney were stored on the UTS system and
discovered during file-system analysis. In this program, binaries were tagged with
unique affiliate IDs, and affiliates were tasked with the propagation of binaries. They
received funds through the Webmoney [3] based on the number of infections that
resulted and their longevity. An excerpt of the contract affiliates agreed to (which
could be found at http://<waledacdomain>/pr/rules.html which describes this
reward system is reproduced below. Note that this was translated from Russian.
“Average bot lifetime lifetime of bots at least 2 hours (120 minutes) - not paid
Average lifetime bot 2 hours (120 minutes) and more - $25 per 1000 downloads
Average lifetime bots 4 hours (240 minutes) and more - $50 per 1000 downloads
Average lifetime bot 8 hours (480 minutes) and more - $100 per 1000 downloads
Average lifetime of bots 24 hours (1440 minutes) and more - $200 per 1000
downloads”
Inspection of the traffic logs maintained on the UTS revealed the following affiliate
IDs: abc, assam, asti, atata, aunt, aunt2, birdie, birdie2, birdie3, birdie4,
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birdie6, birdie7, birdie8, birdie9, dmitriy777, exp7, july4th, kopyha, krab,
lacrimo, sa, lynx, mirabella, mirabella dies, mirabella exp, mirabella exp2,
mirabella exp3, mirabella exp4, mirabella exp5, mirabella exp6, mirabella site,
panda, panda3, pp, s52, savage, slavik, spyware, spyware2, spyware3, spyware49,
steelman, stockholm, stratum, sware50, sware51, swift, swift2, swift3, swift5,
traff, tty2, ttyimsn, twist, ub, udu, and william. With consideration that sev-
eral of these affiliate strings are similar (identical with apparent versioning characters
appended) it is possible there were at least 35 affiliates participating in Waledac’s
FairMoney program. The two most popular affiliate IDs found in the UTS log data
are sware51 and s52, which are found in 82.6% of all hashID-affiliateID pairs. It
should be noted that some hash IDs are associated with more than one unique affili-
ate ID.
4.2.8 Tier Ratios
The ratio of systems in the infected-host tiers can be explored to further define
the structure of this botnet. This ratio is not fixed, but rather is the natural result
of segregating infections with public and private local IP addresses to separate tiers.
Using the UTS population log data, filtered to remove anomalous or spoofed traffic
associated with experiments by other universities and bogon [39] IP addresses, one
can determine daily unique counts for IP addresses and hashes for each tier.
The ratio of Spammer to Repeaters for 18 days in December 2009 is shown in
Figure 13 for IP addresses and hash IDs. For hash IDs, the mean Spammer:Repeater
ratio is 18.974, with sample standard deviation of .796. For IP addresses, the mean
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tier ratio is 22.81 with a sample standard deviation of 1.20. The tier ratios in terms
of IP addresses were explored as this is publicly viewable. The reader should note
that this data is somewhat distorted as the last day of collection was incomplete,
and nodes did not experience as much DHCP churn. As the hash IDs are unique
identifiers for each infection, these reveal a true tier ratio. Two polynomial functions
were fit to this data and are also featured in Figure 13.
One can surmise that for botnets which follow a similar architectural model to
Waledac, where two separate tiers are used for nodes with private and public IP ad-
dresses, this ratio might be similar. This ratio would be influenced by several factors,
however. Namely, a sufficiently large and random sampling of IPv4 space would be
required to determine a true ratio between hosts with public and private network
addresses. Relative to occupied IPv4 space, the size of this botnet is quite small,
and likely not evenly distributed. As Waledac propagated through email addresses,
however, the distribution of its infections would be more random than malware which
spreads in local subnets, either through physical media or network scans followed by
successful exploits.
4.2.9 Demise
On February 24th 2010, the Waledac botnet was systematically incapacitated in an
multilateral operation called “Operation b49” involving Microsoft and several anony-
mous private-sector information-security companies. This operation initially targeted
the network’s fast-flux DNS infrastructure. Following a complaint filed by Microsoft
alleging illegal activity associated with 277 domains, a court-order from a federal
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Figure 13: Tier ratios (Spammers:Repeaters) for Waledac hash IDs and IP addresses,
as viewed from the UTS logging system.
judge was issued which instructed Verisign to de-register these domains. With the
fast-flux infrastructure effectively razed, a peer-to-peer poison attack was initiated,
using methods developed in part by Ben Stock. This attack was designed to redirect
incoming data requests to sinkhole nodes deployed in Microsoft IP space. Finally, sev-
eral of the systems deployed by the botmaster were taken offline by their respective
Internet Service Providers.
The methodology described by Sinclair et al. in [31] was roughly followed, though
the steps were enacted in the incorrect order for guaranteed success. The network
poisoning occurred after the incapacitation of the fast-flux network, which allowed a
brief window of time for the botnet operators to issue an update which instructed bot
nodes to move to an emergency secondary command and control channel. Fortunately,
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this did not occur. The reader should note that this attack did not remove the malware
from the systems residing in the two infected host tiers. Rather, these systems are
merely no longer able to receive instructions from the botmaster or exfiltrate sensitive
data.
CHAPTER 5: DESIGNING AND EVALUATING ENUMERATION TOOLS
This chapter presents real-world implementations of modern botnet enumeration
tools, and explores their coverage and performance characteristics when applied to
two notable botnets: Storm and Waledac.
5.1 Enumerating the Storm Botnet
Our analysis of Storms protocol was complemented by an enumeration attempt
and the creation of an infiltration-based tool. The tool was teamed with a separate
component to test for the presence of firewalls during live enumeration.
5.1.1 Passive Peer Monitor with Live Firewall Probing
The design of the tool is extensively discussed in this section, along with an attempt
to model its coverage, and the probability that a different types of nodes will receive
messages from either PPM instances or legetimate bots. The coverage for this passive
enumeration tool is also compared to a basic network crawler.
5.1.1.1 Design
To discover systems participating in Storm, a Passive P2P Monitor, referred to
as PPM, was developed, and paired with a tool to test for the presence of firewalls:
the FWC or Firewall Checker. A PPM node speaks Storm’s Overnet protocol and
participates in the network routing protocol. It does not send any malicious traffic,
however; it only passively listens in to the Storm network and acts as if it is a
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legitimate bot by routing messages. An additional component of this enumeration
tool is the Firewall Checker (FWC), which sends an additional, external request to
a node following a request to the PPM. If the node does not respond to the request
from the FWC, it is likely the node is behind a firewall. To detect source IP spoofing,
the PPM also is designed to send requests to Storm nodes which contact it to verify
host legitimacy.
Since an open-source implementation of Overnet protocol is not available, the
aMule [1] P2P client was modified to implement a PPM node capable of communi-
cating with the Storm botnet. GUI and file-sharing features of aMule were disabled,
which allowed the PPM node to use very little memory and processing power. After
the switch to an encrypted network, the PPM node was further changed to be able to
talk to the encrypted Storm network. The PPM does respond correctly to all routing
requests.
During network monitoring, source IP address spoofing can affect accuracy in enu-
meration. To remedy this, the tool includes a handshake mechanism which, following
a request from a node and a reply from the PPM, a request is sent from the PPM
to this node. If the node responds, the IP address associated with that node is not
being spoofed. The node may also not respond due to DHCP churn, packet loss in
transmission, or lack of full protocol emulation if an illegitimate node is being queried.
To further improve accuracy, a mechanism was incorporated into the PPM design to
test if a node is behind a firewall. This Firewall Checker (FWC) sends an additional,
external request to a node following a request to the PPM. If the node does not
respond to the request from the FWC, it is likely the node is behind a firewall. This
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is due to the fact that nodes behind firewalls will only allow inbound traffic when they
initiate the connection. Under a number of circumstances nodes not behind firewalls
may also fail to respond to FWC queries. These reasons, listed above, also prevent
the PPM from receiving replies to data requests. Figure 14 shows the components of
the final PPM and FWC architecture.
PPM
BOT
FWC
1 2 ?
2'
?2"
Figure 14: Final Design of the PPM
1. A Storm node in the bot network sends a request to a PPM instance
2. The PPM node replies to the request and sends another request to that Storm
node
2’. At the same time, PPM also sends a message to FWC telling it to send a similar
request to that Storm node
2”. Upon receiving this message, FWC sends a request to the same Storm node
(same request that PPM sent to that Storm node).
If the Storm node replies to 2’, the IP address is not spoofed. If the Storm node
replies to 2”, it is not behind a firewall or a NAT device.
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For this measurement experiment, occurring from August 25th to September 8th
of 2008, 256 PPM nodes run on two computers and deployed evenly across Storm’s
ID space, each bootstrapping using a different peer in the network to ensure more
complete coverage. A single system in the same local network was used for running
an instance of the FWC tool, and an additional computer was used to deploy 16 vir-
tualized instances of real Storm executables in Virtual Machines. One final computer
was used to deploying a crawler in parallel to the PPM instances, which allows one
to compare the network coverage for each method of enumeration. This crawler was
designed to send Overnet routing requests to known nodes and then perform addi-
tional queries to any discovered nodes. The systems in this network were not situated
behind a hardware-based firewall, though illicit traffic from the virtualized execution
of actual Storm binaries was blocked.
Analysis of the gathered population data begins with a determination of how many
Storm bots are behind firewalls. The CDF of the fraction of responses for every node
is shown in Figure 15, where the fraction of responses for an IP addresses is calculated
as:
Number of Responses
Number of Responses + Number of Timeouts
On average, each node in the peer-to-peer network responded to more than 60%
of the PPM requests. Roughly 6% of the IP addresses queried never responded to
any requests from the PPM. Nearly 46% of the discovered nodes did not respond to
the FWC which likely indicates that these nodes are behind firewalls or NAT devices.
Failure to respond to the PPM or FWC could result from other phenomenon described
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Figure 15: CDF of fraction of responses per IP address for both PPM and FWC
earlier in this section.
The number of IP addresses discovered daily by the PPM and network crawler are
shown in Figure 16. Note that the 10 day period where crawler data is not shown is
due to the PPM tool being deployed prior to the crawler. The IP addresses described
in this figure are daily totals, not daily unique totals, exclusive of previously-seen
addresses. The coverage of the PPM tool is consistently higher than the crawler
largely due to the ability of this enumeration technique to discover nodes behind
firewalls.
Whether the enumeration tools are discovering different nodes must also be as-
sessed. Figure 17 shows the percentage of IP addresses found by the crawler and the
PPM instances for each day of execution. While a majority of the bot nodes discov-
ered by the crawler were discovered by PPM nodes, a significant number did not send
a message to the PPM instances. By closely examining these nodes (set C), we found
that these bots had short lifetimes, specifically an average of 19 minutes, while nodes
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Figure 16: Number of IP addresses found by crawler and PPM per day
found by both tools, (comprising set I), had an average life of 100 minutes.
Figure 18 shows the CDF of the lifetimes of the nodes for both cases C (Crawler
− PPM) and I (Crawler & PPM). 80% of nodes in set C have a maximum lifetime
of 10 minutes, while 80% of the nodes in set I have a lifetime of 50 minutes. Nodes
which have a short lifetime are not found by PPM instances. This is expected as the
crawler actively seeks new nodes, while the PPM instances passively wait to receive
messages from peers.
5.1.1.2 Modeling Coverage
The yield from the crawler and PPM instances in this experiment indicated that
network crawling was not an ideal method to enumerate peers in the Storm network.
This section explores in more detail the coverage of the Storm network obtained by
the PPM tool. The likelihood that at least one PPM node will receive a message by a
Storm node is first determined. This analysis is based on the bins and balls problem.
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Figure 17: Percentage of IP addresses found by crawler that were also found by PPM
per day
In the bins and balls problem, one must first assume that they have n bins and 1
ball and must throw the ball into one of the bins. The probability that each bin will
get the ball is 1
n
, assuming that each bin is equally likely to receive the ball. The
probability of a bin not receiving a ball is thus 1 − 1
n
. If k balls are thrown instead
of just 1 ball, the probability of a bin not receiving a ball is (1 − 1
n
)k. Finally, the
probability of a bin receiving at least 1 ball is 1− (1− 1
n
)k.
The same model can be used to determine the likelihood of a a PPM node receiving
at least 1 message from a bot. Simply changing the variables does not work, how-
ever, because in Kademlia-style P2P networks, all the nodes do not have an equal
probability of receiving a message. Some nodes have a higher probability of receiving
a message than others. For example, since a PPM node is online for a long period
of time, it will be in the routing tables of many peers, with the probability it will
receive a message is higher than a Storm node that is only online for 15 minutes per
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Figure 18: CDF of the lifetimes of nodes that (i) were found by the crawler but not
by PPM instances and (ii) found by both the crawler and the PPM instances.
day – a reasonable time for a user to perhaps check their email.
In the bins and balls problem, some bins are “larger” and have a higher probability
of receiving a ball than other bins. Different nodes in the Storm network have a
different probability of receiving a message, as shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20.
The probability of a PPM instance receiving a message from a bot is calculated as
L = 1− (1− p)k, where p is the probability of PPM receiving a message from a bot
for a particular hash, and k is the number of nodes a bot sends a message related
to that hash. Next, the value of p is experimentally determined, showing L is for
varying values of k.
5.1.1.3 Probability of the PPM Receiving a Random Message
To obtain the probability of p of the PPM instances receiving a message from a
Storm-infected node, network data from the virtualized instances of Storm binaries
was utilized. Only 3 message request types were analyzed:
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Figure 19: Number of contacts a bot sends a message to and the number of those
which are PPM nodes for (a) Search, (b) GetSearchResult, and (c) Publish message
types.
0 1000 2000 30000
20
40
60
80
100
Number of Contacts
N
um
be
r o
f f
ou
nd
 N
od
es
0 1000 2000 30000
20
40
60
80
100
Number of Contacts
N
um
be
r o
f f
ou
nd
 N
od
es
0 1000 2000 30000
20
40
60
80
100
Number of Contacts
N
um
be
r o
f f
ou
nd
 N
od
es
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 20: Number of contacts a bot sends a message to and the number of those
contacts which are a certain bot for (a) Search, (b) GetSearchResult, and (c) Publish
message types.
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Figure 21: Distribution of Storm node IDs for search and publish.
• Search - A message used in routing to find replica roots
• GetSearchResult - A message sent to potential replica roots to obtain results
(binding information)
• Publish - A message intended to distribute binding information
The other two request messages in the Overnet protocol are Connect, used to
bootstrap on to the network, and Publicize which is a type of “keep-alive” message
sent regularly.
Observed Connect messages are excluded from analysis as they may introduce bias
for nodes that constantly churn in and out of the Storm network as they are produced
only by incoming nodes. The Publicize requests are also excluded from analysis as
these messages are sent only to nodes in routing tables, and will include bias towards
nodes that are unusually long-lived, such as PPM instances or other experiments.
The other three types of messages are sent more uniformly as shown in Figure 21.
Each node in the network, regardless of their node IDs, is equally likely to receive
Search, GetSearchResult, and Publish messages. 20 target IDs were monitored for
GetSearchResult and Publish, represented by the 20 blue points on the graph. The red
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points represent nodes that are contacted for those target IDs. The x-axis represents
the first 8 bits of the ID (in decimal) of the nodes contacted. For each target ID,
the nodes contacted are uniformly distributed across the ID space. More nodes are
contacted closer to the target ID since those nodes are potentially “replica roots.”
Figure 19 shows the number of nodes that each of the 16 virtualized bots sends a
request to and the number of our PPM nodes which are among those nodes, for the
three message types described above. For example, Figure 19 (a) shows the number of
contacted nodes for Search requests from each of the virtualized bots. Point [1000, 22]
on the graph indicates that a Search request with hash H was sent to 1000 nodes
and 22 of those 1000 nodes were PPM nodes. Each plot point represents a request
for a different hash. A least-squares line of best fit is included, which was determined
using the polyfit algorithm found in Matlab [18].
For Search requests, the probability p (slope of the line of best fit) of the PPM
receiving a message from a Storm node is 2.3%; for GetSearchResult requests, the
probability is 3.3%; and for Publish requests, the probability is 3%. These results are
shown in Table 2.
Table 2: The probability for a random Storm node and a PPM instance for receiving
each of the 3 message types.
Search GetSearchResult Publish
PPM 2.3% 3.3% 3%
Bot 0.95% 0.9% 1.0%
The number of PPM nodes deployed was also varied to observe the impact on
coverage. Figure 22 shows the result of this manipulation for the three message types.
67
A linear increase in the probability that the PPM instances will receive a message
from a bot is observed following an increase in PPM instances. From this graph,
one can obtain the probability p of the PPM instances receiving a message with a
particular hash from a Storm node to be 3% with 256 PPM nodes. Although it might
be tempting to keep increasing the number of PPM nodes to see if the probability
keeps increasing linearly, we show that even with p = 3%, the probability L of PPM
being sent a message from any bot is close to 100%.
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Figure 22: The probability of PPM instances receiving a message from a Storm node
for varying numbers of PPM nodes.
Figure 23 shows the plot of 1 − (1 − p)k with varying k, where k is the number
of nodes that a bot sends at least one message with a Storm hash. Thus, instances
of the PPM tool will receive a message from a bot with high probability (87%) if
k is greater than 100 contacted nodes. If k = 200, the probability goes up to 98%.
Looking at both Figures 19 and 20, each bot sends the same hash (for either of the
three message types) to at least 200 nodes, suggesting that the PPM instances can
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find most of the nodes in the Storm network. It should be emphasized that running
256 concurrent instances of the PPM tool is not resource intensive; each instance uses
only a few megabytes of memory and a small amount of bandwidth and CPU usage.
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Figure 23: Plot of the probability of 256 PPM nodes receiving a message from all the
Storm bots for varying k, where k is the number of nodes contacted by a Storm bot
5.1.1.4 Probability of a Set of Bots Receiving a Random Message
The probability of the PPM receiving a message from a bot is next compared with
the probability that a bot will receive a message from another bot for each hash. 256
“long-lived” IP addresses were chosen in the virtualized-bot data set. Figure 20 shows
the three graphs, along with the line of best fit. The slopes of each graph is less than
the slope for the graphs from Figure 19 for each message type. The probability of
256 PPM nodes seeing a message from a Storm node is higher than the probability
of 256 bots seeing a message from the same Storm node. This does not, however,
indicate that deploying 256 PPM nodes provides a better coverage of the network
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than deploying 256 bare-metal (or virtualized) bots. Rather, in this experiment the
PPM instances had resided in the network for a longer amount of time than the
average Storm node and were more likely to be found in peer routing tables. The
second line in Table 2 shows the probability for each message type for the probability
p of other bots receiving a message from a legitimate Storm bot.
5.2 Enumerating the Waledac Botnet
This section presents three tools created to enumerate Waledac: a crawler, fast-flux
enumerator, and active infiltration-based monitoring tool.
5.2.1 Walleyworld: A Network Crawler
A network crawler was developed that follows the methodology described in Chap-
ter 3 in Chapter 3.1.3. This crawler, dubbed WalleyWorld, was designed to discover
peers participating in the version of Waledac where Repeater nodes maintained peer
data in memory (effectively serving as “routing tables”). The crawler used a fast-flux
domain to seed a table of known nodes, ask these nodes for peer lists, decipher re-
sponses, and continue to recursively query discovered nodes. Unresponsive hosts and
bogon [39] IP addresses were routinely expunged from traversal lists and were rarely
queried.
In the experiment, the crawler was deployed for 39 days in March and April of
2009 at two separate universities, which were run concurrently with a fast-flux DNS
exploitation tool to compare coverage for each of these enumeration methods applied
to this architecture.
70
(a) Deployment: UNCC. (b) Deployment: Georgia Tech.
Figure 24: Discovered nodes using our walleyworld crawler based on methodical peer-
table requests. A crawl “cycle” is defined as one complete traversal of our botnet node
index-lists, which are created using discovered bot nodes in previous cycles. Cycle
completion time grows as traversal lists are populated, but this is limited by the
removal of illegitimate and unresponsive addresses during each cycle.
5.2.2 nswalk: A Fast Flux DNS Exploitation Tool
Waledac used fast-flux DNS throughout its existence. Only bot nodes residing in
the Repeater layer participated in the botnet’s fast-flux DNS scheme. By repeat-
edly resolving domains associated with the botnet and treating returned addresses
as name-servers themselves, one can attempt to enumerate this tier. This query-
ing strategy is referred to as “walking,” and offers an additional vantage-point to
discover infections participating in Waledac. Unfortunately, only IP addresses are
discoverable.
To perform this method of host discovery, a tool originally created by Jose Nazario,
nswalk, was adapted to first query a normal route for a given domain, then treat the
returned IP addresses as name-servers and perform NS queries. Queries are then
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again performed on each NS record that is returned. With time, this process can
produce a large population of nodes participating in the fast-flux DNS infrastructure.
A single instance of the nswalk tool was deployed alongside the two network crawlers
for 39 days in late March and April of 2009. Figure 25 shows the rates at which nodes
are discovered with nswalk. The data shown in this figure represents a period in which
the tool was run without interruption. In the experiment, this form of enumeration
discovered nodes rapidly but did not sustain this rate of unique node discovery over
time. One can surmise that not all Repeater nodes participate in the fast-flux scheme.
A comparison of the coverage between the network crawlers and nswalk is shown in
Table 3.
(a) Newly discovered nodes per day. (b) Aggregate.
Figure 25: Enumeration via fast-flux DNS exploitation using the modified nswalk
tool. A single domain, whocherish.com, was used to initialize this enumeration at-
tempt. Newly discovered nodes by day and nodes discovered in the aggregate are
shown.
1Crawler data only. Nodes are deemed as active when they correctly respond to at least 1 query
by the crawler (i.e. the nodes are accessible and legitimate at least once during the deployment of
the crawlers). This is not indicative of botnet size at a single point in time.
2(Intersection / Union) of the data sets.
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Table 3: Final IP address enumeration results for both walleyworld instances
andnswalk.
Excluding Excluding
Total Discovered Bogon IP Addresses Inactive1 Nodes
walleyworld 110500 97336 97329
nswalk 6924 6920 6920
Overlap2 5.89% 6.68% 6.68%
5.2.3 Walowdac: An Active Infiltration Tool
An active enumeration tool was developed by Ben Stock from the University of
Mannheim to discover infected hosts in Waledac’s lowest two tiers. His tool, Walow-
dac, emulated the behavior of a Repeater node, but rather than forwarding data
requests to other nodes in network, instances of the tool replied directly with manip-
ulated data. Walowdac nodes responded to inbound requests for peer data with their
own network addresses and hash IDs to increase their popularity within the botnet
and increase the probability that they would be contacted by infected hosts. Inbound
traffic from other nodes in the botnet was logged, allowing the tool to enumerate bots
functioning as Repeaters and Spammers.
Instances of Walowdac were deployed at several universities, and an 8-day time
overlap of this deployment exists with the UTS log data. Table 4 documents the
daily number of unique infections (hash IDs) visible in each data set and the overlap,
or percentage of peers found in the intersection of the two sets of data out of their
union.
The high daily overlap with the total population (viewable via the UTS logs)
demonstrates the success of infiltration-based measurement in discovering infected
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Table 4: Comparison of the data obtained from Walowdac and the UTS popula-
tion logs for a period of 8 days showing unique hash ID counts and set intersection
percentages.
12/15 12/16 12/17 12/18 12/19 12/20 12/21 12/22
UTS Logs 33930 27179 37329 35425 35602 33463 32173 46929
Walowdac 23494 24337 27389 28379 28273 27164 27488 35492
Overlap 69.24 % 89.54 % 73.37 % 80.11 % 79.41 % 81.18 % 85.44 % 75.63 %
hosts. For the Waledac architecture, this technique also maintains an advantage over
fast-flux exploitation methods and network crawlers as these cannot enumerate nodes
outside of the single-tier peer-to-peer segment of the botnet. As analysis of the UTS
logs indicates that a significant percentage of the botnet is comprised of infections
in the Spammer layer, enumeration using infiltration-based methods is necessary for
mitigation. Deployment of this tool, however, did require precise emulation of a
legitimate Waledac infection.
5.3 Summary
This study of enumeration methods applied to varying architectures provides ev-
idence that higher yields are produced when one can more completely emulate a
botnet’s communication protocol; when behavior is understand, it can be exploited.
This knowledge comes at the expense of time, however. Such tools are also likely
sensitive to protocol changes and would not be characterized as robust. The methods
include network crawling and infiltration-based monitoring.
Conversely, enumeration methods that are rapidly deployable and continue to dis-
cover hosts in the face of protocol changes tend to lack the ability to enumerate com-
pletely. Darknet monitoring and fast-flux DNS exploitation are examples of these
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methods. Figure 26 suggests a reasonable deployment path for enumeration tools
with consideration to time and yield. Methods toward the left of this figure are
rapidly deployable but return reduced yield. As one approaches the right, yield is
increased. The final “method” of gaining access to a main command and control
server is included for completeness.
Local Execution 
Monitoring
Fast Flux DNS 
Exploitation
DNS Sinkhole
IP Darkspace 
Monitoring
Network 
Crawler
Inltration-Based 
Monitoring
Botnet Log 
Access
Figure 26: Reasonable deployment path for enumeration tools with consideration of
time needed for implementation and probable yield.
CHAPTER 6: ACCURACY IN BOTNET POPULATION ESTIMATION
Estimating botnet sizes using raw IP address counts can lead to over- and under-
counting due to network features such as DHCP, NAT, proxies, and VPNs, as well as
commuting users with mobile computers. This chapter explores methods to discover
NAT and DHCP boundaries in network populations and quantify the IP address
inflation which results. An entropy-based measurement of botnet size is proposed,
which can be used to describe a botnet’s footprint or its active size.
6.1 An Entropy-Based Inflation Rate
Within a botnet population, let I represent the set of unique IP addresses observed
H represent the set of infected hosts. While botnets are most commonly observable
by only their IP addresses, in the case when both types of identifiers are available, a
naive estimate of the IP inflation rate can be computed as a simple ratio of the two :
RN(I,H) =
|I|
|H|
For each individual j in a botnet population J (for example infected hosts, or IP
addresses), let aj be the volume of measured activity associated with j. Activity
can be measured in different units for different botnets, for example, scanning rates,
spamming rates, or counts of C&C keep-alives.
The naive inflation ratio lacks the ability to describe how distributed an infection
76
is through this IP space. An entropy-based inflation ratio, however, does possess
this capability. The footprint distribution pJ is defined as the relative proportion of
activity aj associated with each individual observed throughout the botnet’s history,
measured in the particular unit of observation:
pJ(j) =
aj∑
k∈J ak
For a population J with footprint distribution pJ , the entropy S(pJ) is defined as:
S(pJ) = −
∑
j∈J
pJ(j) ln[pJ(j)]
Entropy summarizes the footprint distribution according to its degree of uniformity.
A footprint distribution that assigns all of its activity to a single individual would
have entropy equal to 0. Conversely, a footprint distribution that uniformly allocates
activity of 1/N to N unique individuals would have maximal entropy, equal to ln(N).
A measure of the IP inflation rate based on the footprint distributions pI and pH
among IP addresses and individuals in a botnet is given by the calculation:
RE(pI , pH) = exp [S(pI)− S(pH)].
The difference S(pI)−S(pH) is also known as the relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler
divergence [17] of the two distributions. RE can be calculated for entire botnet
histories, or for subsets of activity pertaining to periods of time or locations in space.
Calculated across an entire botnet’s history or smaller time increments, RE is an
extension of RN that accounts for differences in both size and allocation of activity.
RE = RN when both pI and pH are uniform distributions. However, RE 6= RN when
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random IP assignment (for example, from DHCP leases) spreads unequal activity
from N hosts equally between N IP addresses.
6.2 Building Rate-Preserving Partitions
The value RE can be calculated for any collection of IP addresses I` ⊂ I and the
hosts H` that comprise all of the non-zero activity associated with I`, or vice versa.
The IP space of a botnet, for example, can be decomposed by Autonomous System
Number (ASN), country code, or CIDR block, to study the average IP inflation rate
of each of these sub-populations. The botnet can also be decomposed into individual
hosts, to study the average individual IP inflation rate per unique infection.
Each of these collections is a partition of its corresponding set (I or H). The union
of these overlapping sets is equal to the entire botnet population. Further, the sum
of all activity across any of these partitions comprises all of the activity of a botnet.
However, the weighted average of RE will not sum to the overall IP inflation rate of the
botnet, unless the original partitioning sets are carefully chosen. This research must
therefore pursue a method for preserving inflation rates in the creation of partitions
to avoid creating overlapping sets.
Let ahi be the volume of activity between individual h and IP address i. For botnet
populations H and I of individual hosts and IP addresses, define the undirected graph
G with vertices V = {H ∪ I} and edges E = {ahi : h ∈ H, i ∈ I}. Any sub-graph
G` ⊂ G contains a set of vertices V` = {(H` ⊂ H) ∪ (I` ⊂ I)} and a set of edges
E` = {ahi : h ∈ H`, i ∈ I`} of non-zero activity between H` and I` that induce
footprint distributions pH` and pI` . For simplicity, the IP inflation rate of these
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elements of G` is denoted as:
RE(G`) = RE(pI` , pH`).
Let a` be the sum of all activity ahi associated with a sub-graph G`, and define
aL =
∑
` a` as the total activity for a botnet. The weighted IP inflation rate of any
sub-graph G` is defined as
a`
aL
RE(G`). A rate-preserving collection of sub-graphs of G
is defined as any collection that satisfies the following equality:
lnRE(G) =
∑
`
a`
aL
lnRE(G`).
If a path of non-zero-valued edges exists that join v1 to v2, the vertices v1 and v2 in
G are connected. The graph G can be partitioned into strongly connected components,
which are disjoint sub-graphs where all vertices within each sub-graph are connected,
and no vertices between sub-graphs are connected. The set of vertices and edges
associated with each strongly connected component is referred to as an equivalence
class. The collection of sets of vertices corresponding to each of the strongly connected
components of G is denoted by {V }SCC.
The sigma algebra σ({A`}L1 ) of a collection of sets is defined as the set of all unions,
intersections, and complements of sets in the collection. When {A`}L1 is a partition,
σ({A`}L1 ) is equal to the union of the empty set ∅ and the power set of all unions
of subsets A`. Using these definitions, the relationship between strongly connected
components and the IP inflation rate is summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (rate-preserving sub-graphs) Suppose that the collection of sets {H`}L1
form a partition of the hosts H in G. Let {G`}L1 be the sub-graphs of G obtained by
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taking I` ⊂ V` as the set {i : ahi > 0 for at least one h ∈ H`}. Then the following
inequality holds:
lnRE(G) ≤
∑
`
a`
aL
lnRE(G`),
with equality occurring if and only if σ({H`}L1 ) ⊂ σ({V }SCC).
Theorem 1, with a proof in Appendix A.3, holds with the inequality in the opposite
direction for sub-graphs induced on H associated with any partition of I. The theo-
rem states that the only rate-preserving collections of sub-graphs of G that partition
one population, and examine all non-zero activity of this partition among the other
population, are collections whose vertices consist of unions of strongly connected com-
ponents. This result implies that any study of IP inflation rate across sub-networks
of a botnet should use equivalence classes as the basic “building blocks” of activity.
6.3 Finding Subnets via Localized Component Clustering
The equivalence classes of G cluster individuals and IP addresses into related net-
works of activity. Large rates of RE(G`) or large IP entropy S(pI`) within an equiva-
lence class can indicate the presence of a region experiencing DHCP churn. Assuming
transitivity of relationships between hosts and IP addresses, the IP addresses in each
equivalence class represent likely points of communication (formerly held addresses)
for any of the associated hosts in the class, weighted by observed activity within the
sub-graph. Unfortunately, host ID collisions, erroneous ASN mappings, or hosts us-
ing open proxies, VPN connections, or spoofed IP addresses can link clusters of IP
addresses into equivalence classes across ISPs, ASNs, or even countries. To mitigate
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these effects in mapping DHCP regions, a localized version of connected component
clustering is employed as follows:
1. For each host h ∈ H, the modal ASN Mh of h is defined as the set of IP addresses
in the autonomous system through which the largest proportion of h’s activity
ah occurred.
2. Remove from G any edge (h, i) such that i 6∈Mh.
The resulting intra-ASN equivalence classes that are produced are more inter-
pretable as DHCP regions belonging to a single network provider. The set P of
pruned edges is denoted as the inter-ASN network and the resulting pruned graph is
referred to as GP . It must be noted that restricting equivalence classes to reside only
within ASNs does sacrifice some explanatory power for interpretability. The weight
WE(P ) of the inter-ASN network as the ratio of IP inflation ratesis defined as:
WE(P ) =
RE(G)
RE(GP )
.
The intra-ASN equivalence classes are rate-preserving for GP , but they cannot ac-
count for the weight of P . A ratio WE(P ) close to 1 indicates that the pruned
edges have little effect on the overall IP inflation rate of the botnet. However, if
WE(P ) = RE(G), this indicates that P contains all inter-connectivity in G.
6.4 Application: Waledac
This section describes the result of the above techniques applied to the Waledac
botnet to learn more about its IP inflation rate from the presence of NAT and DHCP
regions.
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6.4.1 Data Collection
These analysis techniques were applied to data gathered from the command and
control server in the Waledac botnet which provides total network coverage. To
perform this data collection, specialized HTTP GET requests for logs were sent to a
node in the second highest layer, the TSL tier, which were forwarded to a single node
in the UTS tier. Logs maintained on this system record a variety of inbound bot node
messages. Requests were only forwarded when the User-Agent contained the string
LMK. The nginx proxy on the TSL tier controls this access. The retrieval method is
shown in Figure 11 in Section 4.2.6. Several log files, 1-first.txt, 2-notify.txt,
and 4-words.txt contained timestamps, IP addresses, and unique hash IDs for each
node reporting or requesting data. Population data found in these logs documents
activity from both of Waledac’s infected host tiers.
Logs were retrieved during the period of December 4th through December 22nd,
2009. ASNs and approximate latitude and longitude coordinates were compiled for
each IP address using the Maxmind GeoLite ASN [19] and City [20] databases. A total
of 44412486 log-ins from infected hosts were observed in the UTS logs, comprising
172283 unique hashes and 667033 unique IP addresses.
The graph associated with the complete, unfiltered set of traffic is referred to as
GF . Any hash that belongs to an equivalence class with only itself and one unique
IP address is called a singleton (or singleton pair in reference to both hash and IP
address). Any hash that belongs to an equivalence class with multiple hashes and
only a single IP address (as would occur with network address translation) is called a
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static sharer. Any hash seen communicating through multiple IP addresses is referred
to as a mobile hash.
6.4.2 Data Filtering to Remove Chaff
To discover proportions of bot nodes in dynamically allocated IP space, population
data must first be carefully cleaned to remove anomalous log-ins from illegitimate
hosts or other spoofed traffic.
Two sub-graphs of GF were used in the analysis. A filtered graph GL ⊂ GF
was created to remove anomalous, illegitimate traffic. Then, localized component
clustering was used to create an inter-ASN graph GP ⊂ GL, in order to study sub-
networks of related activity within ASN.
6.4.2.1 Filtering Aliases
Within the Waledac UTS data, several similarly composed hashes were discovered
which were mapped to an unusually diverse set of IP addresses. Several of these hash
IDs appear to be “man-made,” and are not the result of natural (sufficiently random)
or expected (determined through reverse-engineering) execution and activity.
This activity is possible as the Waledac network was open to monitoring, infiltra-
tion, and the manipulation of hash IDs for research or monitoring purposes. An alias
is defined as a hash that appears to represent multiple infected hosts, multiple alter-
native hashes, spoofed traffic, or a reconnaissance or data-gathering process initiated
by either researchers or botnet administrators. Any study of the IP inflation rate for
Waledac should not include aliases, as even a relatively small number of aliases can
have a large effect on the botnet’s footprint (both RN and RE). A suspect hash was
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excluded from G by removing all log-ins associated with the hash. A set of 45 hashes,
totaling 8% of all log-ins, were excluded from G, with the remaining 92% of log-ins
comprising GL.
A set of 18 hashes seen generating traffic from IPv4 bogon addresses [39] were
excluded as aliases of spoofed traffic. As these packets should not be found on the
public Internet, they are assumed to be illegitimate. A set of 11 hashes communicating
through IP addresses belonging to the University of Mannheim were also excluded
as aliases of concurrent research efforts. Communication with a researcher at this
university confirmed that this traffic was the result of several experiments and was
not produced by legitimate Waledac bots.
To discover aliases for other spoofed addresses or multiple infections, each mo-
bile hash h was assigned a mobility score to quantify how aggressively it moved
through physical IPv4 space. Let t1, · · · , tK be a hash’s ordered log-in timestamps,
and c1, · · · , cK be its associated latitude and longitude co-ordinates. The mobility
score δ measures the average speed (in miles per hour) with which a hash changes
locations in its log-ins:
δ =
1
K − 1
K∑
k=2
∆(ck, ck−1)
tk − tk−1
,
where ∆(·) is the Haversine [43] or great-circle distance between the two locations:
haversin( dR) = haversin(ϕ1 − ϕ2) + cos(ϕ1)cos(ϕ2)haversin(∆λ)
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Where haversin(θ) = 12 (1− cos(θ))
d = great-circle distance between points
R = sphere radius
ϕ1 = latitude, point 1
ϕ1 = latitude, point 2
∆λ = longitudinal separation between points
A mobility score can be interpreted as the estimated average speed (in miles-per-
hour) a system would be required to physically move throughout its life for it to
indeed be a single, unique infection. While certain network features such as proxies
and VPNs allow for rapid movement in IP space which can correspond with large
perceived geographic distances, an assumptions is made that rapid oscillation between
addresses for long periods of time, which would inflate the mobility score greatly,
occurs rarely. Also, while mobile computing devices may rove as their owners travel,
the mobility scores should reflect the physical limitations of this kind of movement.
Outlying mobility scores are evidence of hashes aliasing multiple infected hosts that
check in concurrently from wide-spread locations.
This process was implemented in Ruby to create geoFilter, which is reproduced
in Appendix 7.2.
The results from this tool when applied to the UTS population data are shown in
Figure 27. Hash IDs with unusually high mobility scores are identifiers deemed to
be non-unique or illegitimate, and are present due to various phenomenon discussed
previously.
Figure 28 shows a histogram of mobility scores on the log scale, with curves indi-
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Figure 27: Mobility scores for hash IDs found in Waledac population data.
cating the best mixture of Normal distributions that fit the data [9]. Two groups are
apparent; 89% of hashes move on average less than 10 miles per hour, while 11% of
hashes appear more mobile. The top 10 scores are marked by solid black lines. Dashed
lines mark the upper percentiles of 0.001, 0.0001, and 0.00001. An outlier analysis
based on Monte Carlo simulations of this distribution flagged hashes with the top
three mobility scores (23272.11MpH, 8114.45MpH, and 5471.55MpH) as anomalies.
An additional 21 hashes were flagged as suspected aliases for the three mobility
outliers due to shared substrings in hash IDs (for example,
“990024015e300d441c49064db74d4715de54b33912” and
“3e0f990024015e300d441c49064db74d4715de54b3”)
One can obtain these hash IDs by appending and prepending a small number of
characters to the three mobility score outliers. This overlapping behavior, which is
not found with any other of Waledac’s hash IDs is shown in Figure 29. These hashes
also do not possess the characteristics expected of hashes generated by Waledac’s
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hash algorithm, as described in Section 4.2.3.4.
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Figure 28: Probability histrogram and bimodal log-normal model for hash mobility
scores.
6.4.3 Results
6.4.3.1 Initial Data Summary: GF , GL and GP
Python scripts were developed to produce network equivalence classesand perform
the entropy calculations. Table 5 summarizes the IP address counts, hash counts and
IP inflation rates for the three graphs of Waledac log-insdescribed previously. The
effect of aliases can be seen in both RN and RE, but it is more pronounced in RE,
which reduces by a factor of 2 when the aliases are removed. This is the effect of
the top mobility score outlier, a product of spoofed network traffic, that comprised
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5e300d441c49064db74d4715de54b3
5e300d441c49064db74d4715de54b339
990024015e300d441c49064db74d47
990024015e300d441c49064db74d4715de54b33912
3e0f990024015e300d441c49064db74d4715de54b3
3e0f990024015e300d441c49064db7
3c15877e0c393e0f990024015e300d
a62edb123c15877e0c393e0f990024
a62edb123c15877e0c393e0f99002401
a62edb123c15877e0c393e0f990024015e300d441c
Mobility Score Outliers
1c49064db74d4715de54b339122d4d
#1
#2
#3
db123c15877e0c393e0f990024015e
064db74d4715de54b339122d4d07c84d4364
064db74d4715de54b339122d4d07c84d4364bb668b
122d4d07c84d4364bb668b42a6261f
4d07c84d4364bb668b42a6261f70035d5a7a7d7609
4d07c84d4364bb668b42a6261f70035d5a7a7d760945
de54b339122d4d07c84d4364bb668b42a6261f
b30ba62edb123c15877e0c393e0f99
de54b339122d4d07c84d4364bb668b42a6261f70
Figure 29: Overlapping hashes with the three mobility score outliers. This behavior
is unique to this set of hashes and is not found in the rest of the occupied hash ID
space.
nearly 6% of activity in GF , across 89686 IP addresses. Accounting for distribution
of activity in GL reduces the inflation effect of measuring an IP footprint versus a
hash footprint, as shown by the reduction in RE vs. RN . The weight of the inter-
ASN network P is (2.27/2.00) = 1.135. This seems to be a reasonable tradeoff of
explanatory power versus interpretability of intra-ASN equivalence classes.
Table 5: Naive and entropy-based IP inflation rates calculated for three different
sub-graphs of the Waledac botnet.
G |I| |H| aG/aGF RN RE
GF 667033 172283 1.00 3.87 4.56
GL 548997 172238 0.92 3.18 2.27
GP 475665 172238 0.86 2.76 2.00
A majority of hashes in GL (63.6%) are associated with only a single IP address.
Singleton pairs comprise 55.9% of hashes and 17.5% of all IP addresses in GL. Sin-
gleton pairs and static sharers comprise nearly two thirds of legitimate hashes, but
only 18.5% of all observed IP addresses. The top 1% of hashes in GL are very mobile,
however, are associated with 80 or more IP addresses, with a maximum of 428 IP
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addresses observed for a single hash. The mobile hashes in GL comprise only 36.3%
of all hashes, but communicate through 81.4% of observed IP addresses. The dis-
tribution of the number of unique IP addresses for each hash is shown in Figure 30.
The sub-graphs in GP are used to examine the breakdown of IP allocation in greater
detail, with the explicit goal of determining the boundaries of DHCP regions which
contribute to this result.
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Figure 30: Distribution of the number of unique IP addresses observed per hash in
GL.
Figure 30 shows the distribution of the number of unique IP addresses observed
per hash for GL.
6.4.3.2 Equivalence Class Topology in GP
Figure 31 is a plot of IP entropy vs. Hash entropy for the 153734 equivalence classes
that comprise GP . The units are shown on the exponentiated scale to display an
“Effective Population Size” for each equivalence class, since exp[S(pj)] = N when pj
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Figure 31: “Effective Size” exp[S(pj)] of IP Addresses vs. Hashes for equivalence
classes in GP .
is uniform across N items. The y = x line marks the subnetworks for which RE = 1,
with inflation growing in severity toward the top left of the chart, and deflation
growing in severity toward the bottom right. NATs appear along the horizontal
line exp[S(pI)] = 1. The largest intra-ASN NAT contained 128 hashes, though an
unequal activity distribution among hashes increased the IP inflation rate from 1/128
to approximately 1/79. The majority of equivalence classes appear above the equality
line, indicating RE > 1. The largest DHCP effect for a single hash (appearing along
the vertical line exp[S(pH)] = 1) corresponds to the largest mobile hash in GL, which
was assigned its own equivalence class with 428 unique IP addresses and an inflation
rate of 233/1.
Four additional equivalence classes(A,B,C, and D) are highlighted on the graph
90
Table 6: Naive and entropy-based IP inflation rates calculated for four equivalence
classes.
G |I| |H| aG RN RE
A 6789 438 317435 15.50 9.08
B 145 533 119684 0.27 0.89
C 5 5 296 1.00 0.45
D 16 16 1746 1.00 6.06
for further illustrative analysis. The characteristics of these equivalence classes are
explored in the next section.
6.4.3.3 Exploring Four Types of Networks
Table 6 summarizes the four equivalence classes within GP that are highlighted
in Figure 31. Activity sizes are shown as the number of log-ins observed for each
equivalence class. Figure 32 shows activity profiles of each equivalence class, plotting
the ordered weights pJ`(j), for both hashes (dotted lines) and IP addresses (solid
lines). Plots are shown on log scales to balance the effect of relatively large proportions
assigned to the top few individuals versus small proportions spread among large
numbers of individuals.
Class A was chosen for inspection as it has the largest number of IP addresses
assigned for any equivalence class in GP . The top IP address and top hash in this
class each received approximately 1.5% of activity in A, but pI is much more wide-
spread in the tails than pH , contributing to an inflation rate of 9 to 1 even accounting
for activity. Class A is a member of a Saudi Arabian ASN that appears to be an ISP
with a very large DHCP pool. It is possible that the ASN mappings for this region,
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Figure 32: Activity profiles of four equivalence classes.
which relies heavily on satellite ISPs, are erroneous. In total 1861 equivalence classes
belong to this ASN, all with overlapping IP ranges, which suggests that they are part
of the same DHCP network. The overall IP inflation rate RE of the union of these
1861 classes is 7 to 1.
Class B has the largest number of hashes assigned for any equivalence class in GP .
Despite having 3.67 times as many hashes as IP addresses, the entropy inflation RE of
B is only slightly under 1. As seen by the activity profile, B’s unequal hash activity is
spread much more evenly across its available IP addresses, suggesting a DHCP pool
with a short lease. Class B is one of only two equivalence classes in its ASN, assigned
to a broadband provider in the United States. Non-overlapping IP ranges suggest
that the two equivalence classes represent two differently leased sub-networks.
92
Classes C and D highlight the effect of differences in allocation of activity on the
entropy-based inflation rate RE. For each of these classes, the number of IP addresses
is equal to the number of hashes, however the activity profiles differ considerably.
Class C shows a network with 5 relatively active infected hosts that appear to check
in mostly with a single IP address (75% of activity). Class C is one of 672 overlapping
equivalence classes, with a overall inflation rate of 6 to 1 among the union, within a
large telecom company based in Vietnam. C could possibly represent a static gateway
that occasionally changes location. Class D, rather, appears to spread activity from
one very active hash (89% of logins) and fifteen hashes which are more ephemeral
evenly among a DHCP pool of 16 addresses. D belongs to an ASN that contains 5
other equivalence classes, 4 of which are singletons, and another that also appears to
be a DHCP pool belonging to the same provider as D.
6.4.3.4 Time-Based Inflation
Inflation rates can also be viewed in cumulative daily totals. This offers insight into
the amount of inflation that can be expected as a population is enumerated This daily
inflation is shown in Figure 33. Inflation rates for Spammer and Repeater plotted
separately. It can be theorized that Repeater nodes bear lower inflation rates than
infected hosts in the Spammer tier, as these nodes have public IP addresses and may
not be subjected to as much network movement as hosts in NAT blocks, as these
NAT blocks may rove behind multiple public addresses. From this data, this notion
is confirmed. Nodes in the Repeater tier produce less inflation over time.
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Figure 33: Daily cumulative inflation for the Waledac population. Naive and entropy-
based rates are shown.
6.5 Summary and Applicability
Observable relationships between IP addresses and infected hosts provides insight
not only into the particular botnet, but also into the networks that compose it.
Although the type of infection may change, the characteristics of infected network
space dictated by administrators are relatively consistent, including DHCP regions,
NAT policies, and throughput rates. Equivalence classes constructed from observable
botnets such as Waledac can be used to map out the boundaries of shared IP address
pools and to profile network properties such as load-balancing thresholds and DHCP
lease times among these networks.
This information can be utilized in the study of less visible botnets, such as Con-
ficker, by using measured network profiles to adjust and refine population models
94
based on behavior. Not only can one transfer information directly between networks
that house both kinds of infections, statistical models can be used to extrapolate
this information and infer the unobservable properties of a hidden botnet across its
footprint. Finally, measuring a footprint distribution as opposed to direct counts can
help to determine the potential threat of a botnet’s available assets, either infected
hosts or IP addresses.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
This chapter reiterates and clearly defines the contributions of this dissertation
work and discusses future research to extend these findings. The contributions are
documented in Section 7.1, and potential future work is delineated in Section 7.2.
7.1 Contributions
In an effort to organize and document existing and new botnet enumeration tech-
niques, Chapter 3 presented 7 methods to discover infected hosts participating in ma-
licious networks. Tools designed to implement several of these conceptual methods,
including infiltration-based monitoring, network crawling, and fast-flux DNS exploita-
tion were developed and deployed to enumerate the Storm and Waledac botnets.
Their coverage and performance was characterized in Chapter 5, and a deployment
strategy was proposed for these tools and methods to optimize yield given the slow
discovery of botnet protocols which allow for more rapid and complete enumeration.
The architectures, communication protocols, and malicious output for the Storm
and Waledac botnets were presented in Chapter 4. These botnets were operational
at the time of their study, and their topologies, protocols, and other behaviors were
unknown. The findings for Waledac’s architecture are particularly insightful, as net-
work traces and file-system data from botmaster-deployed systems were inspected to
document the back-end infrastructure. The study of this infrastructure revealed pre-
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viously unknown deployment methodologies, hidden defensive techniques, the botnets
economic model, and new ways to leverage infected hosts. These findings impacted
enumeration techniques and remediation strategies. Additionally, complete popula-
tion logs gathered from a top-tier command and control server allowed for the rigorous
study of its population characteristics. This research contributes toward the overall
understanding of modern botnet architectures.
Finally, a method to measure IP inflation based on relative entropy across IP
addresses and unique machine IDs was developed and presented in Chapter 6. Unlike
a naive ratio of IP addresses to unique identifiers, entropy is capable of describing a
botnet or network footprint distribution according to its uniformity. Rate-preserving
partitioning of a botnet’s historical footprint was demonstrated, along with how to
construct connected sub-networks that highlight DHCP regions and NAT blocks.
These methods were applied to Waledac population data, where entropy rates for
a total footprint and cumulative daily time-slices were discovered. Four types of
networks within Waledac were scrutinized in an attempt to present how inflation rates
can vary within a botnet given different network structures. In total, this network
characterization constitutes work toward pursuing accuracy in botnet size and threat
estimation.
7.2 Future Work
The methods developed to enumeration botnets can be applied to other botnet
structures, and their performance more quantitatively explored. Further, while the
enumeration techniques presented in this study are applicable to current botnet archi-
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tectures, evolutionary changes in botnet structures will likely necessitate the creation
of new techniques to discover hosts. Changes in communication protocols or schemes,
deployed services, and defensive mechanisms have the potential to impede host dis-
covery.
The Storm and Waledac botnets represent two successful architectures capable of
generating profit. The botnets are believed to be of the same lineage, and while both
are no longer operational, a new botnet which bears a strikingly similar architecture
to Storm and Waledac was discovered in early January 2011. This new botnet,
along with other future botnets with sophisticated architectures will also need to be
inspected and documented to continue the development of remediation techniques.
Finally, accuracy in enumeration must continue to be explored, specifically with re-
gard to the impact of DHCP churn and NAT blocks when counting raw IP addresses.
Methods to define the boundaries of these network structures in botnet populations
must be refined or developed, particularly when bot infections do not bear unique
identifiers. The entropy-based inflation rate can be applied to other botnets to deter-
mine whether the inflation characteristics of Waledac hold true for other samples of
network space. The Conficker malware family is a likely target for such research.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY CODE, DATA AND THEOREMS
This appendix contains supplementary details related to the created tools and
discovered protocol details. A proof for a mathematical theorem is also included.
A.1 Reproduced Code
This section includes reproduced code from tools developed during this study.
A.1.1 WalleyWorld
The WalleyWorld crawler was designed to discover nodes participating in the peer-
to-peer layer of the Waledac botnet. Only Repeater nodes were enumerated using
this tool. The decoding method from this tool is reproduced below.
def decode(message)
message = message.tr(’_-’, ’/+’).gsub(/[\r\n\s]/,’’)
message += "=" while message.length \% 4 != 0
data = Base64.decode64(message)
offset = 0
key = [0xEF, 0xC2, 0x25, 0xCD, 0x36, 0xBB, 0x77, 0xE3, 0x69, 0x1B,
0xE0, 0x96, 0xC5, 0x40, 0xD8, 0x78].pack("C*")
out = rijndael_decrypt(key, data[offset,1E9])
BZ2::bunzip2(out)
end
end
A.1.2 geoFilter.rb
The geoFilter.rb tool was designed to compute the Mobility Scores for Waledac
infections. This metric is described in Section 6.4.2. Three code fragments are re-
produced here: the Haversine function required for Great Circle distance calculation
between latitude and longitude coordinates, the speed calculation, and the final Mo-
bilty Score computation.
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A.1.2.1 Haversine Function
#haversine - find distance along a great circle
def haversine_distance( lat1, lon1, lat2, lon2 )
rpd = 0.01745329251994 #rad per degree; PI/180
dlon = lon2 - lon1
dlat = lat2 - lat1
dlon_rad = dlon * rpd
dlat_rad = dlat * rpd
lat1_rad = lat1 * rpd
lon1_rad = lon1 * rpd
lat2_rad = lat2 * rpd
lon2_rad = lon2 * rpd
x = (Math.sin(dlat_rad/2))**2 + Math.cos(lat1_rad) *
Math.cos(lat2_rad) * (Math.sin(dlon_rad/2))**2
y = 2 * Math.atan2( Math.sqrt(x), Math.sqrt(1-x))
dMi = 3956.6 * y #radius of eath in miles * c = delta between points
return dMi
end
end
A.1.2.2 Speed Calculation
#masterset = array of hash clusters
until masterSet[0] == nil
aSet = masterSet.pop()
aMovement = []
aLoc = []
aInd = 0
$aDropped = 0
aSet[2].each do |aSetEntry|
aCord = gf.getCord(aSetEntry)
if (aCord == nil) #unknown IPs
$aDropped+=1
else
aLoc << aCord
if (aInd!=0)
#get estimated geographic distance between IPs,
#divide by time between log entries, mult by 3600
aDistChange = gf.haversine_distance(aLoc[aInd][0],aLoc[aInd][1],
aLoc[(aInd-1)][0],aLoc[(aInd-1)][1])
aTimeDiff = (aSet[1][aInd].to_f) - (aSet[1][aInd-1].to_f)
if aTimeDiff == 0.0 #inject time diff for entries w/ same time
aTimeDiff = 0.1
end
aMovement << 3600*(aDistChange.to_f/aTimeDiff)
end
aInd+=1
end
end
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A.1.2.3 Mobility Score Calculation
aMoveSum = aMovement.inject(0){|b,i| b+i}
aMovementLength = aMovement.length()
if aMovementLength == 0 #all available IPs were dropped; force a score of 0
aMovementLength = 1
end
aMobScore = (aMoveSum / aMovementLength)
puts aSet[0] + "|" + aMobScore.to_s + "|" + aMovement.length().to_s +
"|" + $aDropped.to_s
A.2 Botnet Case Study Data
This appendix contains information related to the case-studies for the Storm and
Waledac botnets. File-system contents, script contents, communication protocol
specifics, supplementary population statistics, and a mathematical theorem as a ref-
erence for the reader.
A.2.1 Waledac Command and Reply Syntax
Tables 7 and 8 explicate the types, purpose, and syntax for Waledac’s communica-
tion protocol. Note that in Table 7, the Command Names correspond with the types
of logs discovered on the botnet’s primary command and control server.
105
Table 7: Valid Waledac Command Request Types
Command
Number
Command
Name
Purpose XML Attributes
0 (aliased as
0xFF)
getkey Request is used to obtain
the AES key for use in com-
mands 1-7
<p n=cert>{ASCII form of node’s public
cert} </p>
1 first
Identifies the infected node’s
OS version and the “label” of
the bot binary
<p n=winver> (major OS version).(minor
OS version).(OS subversion)</p>
<p n=label>(mirabella site or lynx)</p>
2 notify
Request instructions from
C&C for upcoming
campaigns
<p n=“label”> (mairabella site or
lynx)</p>
<p n=“time sys”> (current time in
ASCII)</p>
<p n=“time init”> (time node was activated
in ASCII)</p>
<p n=“time now”> (current time in
ASCII)</p>
<p n=“time ticks”> (current tickcount,
converted to 64bit ASCII)</p>
3 taskreq Request spam campaign
configuration
4 words Request meaning of
variables used in spam
templates obtained from
taskreq
<p n=“word name”>(word)</p>
5 taskrep
Report campaign details (e.g.
spam sending success, which
email addresses were
spammed, etc.)
<props><p n=“b64”>true</p></props>
<reports><rep id= “(%d number)”
rcpt= “(email address in Base64
encoding)”>(status in base64 encod-
ing)</rep></reports>
6 httpstats
(Sent by repeaters only.)
Internal HTTP access log
from phishing activity
<props><p n=“b64”>true</p></props>
<http stats><stat ip=“(ip address that
made a request)” time=“(time of request
in UNIX decimal format)”> <![CDATA[(the
URL request in typical W3C log for-
mat)]] ></stat></http stats>
7 emails Report of email addresses
found on the victims ma-
chine
<emails><![CDATA[(emails, one per line
)]] ></emails>
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Table 8: Waledac Bot Replies
Command
Number
Command
Name
Purpose XML Attributes
0 (aliased as
0xFF)
getkey Replies with AES key to use
for commands 1-7 in an en-
crypted form
<p n=key>(base64 encoded RSA encrypted
AES key)</p>
1 first Empty acknowledgement
2 notify
Instructions from C&C for
upcoming campaigns and
possibly node update URLs
<p n=“ptr”>(RDNS of node) </p>
<p n=“ip”>(IP of node) </p>
<p n=“dns ip”> (DNS server to use) </p>
<p n=“smtp ip”>(SMTP server to test)
</p>
<p n=“sender threads”>( the number of
sender threads to activate at once) </p>
<p n=“sender queue”> (Unknown pur-
pose)</p>
<p n=“short logs”> (Unknown pur-
pose)</p>
<p n=“http cache timeout”> (Timeout for
caching proxy/repeater data)</p>
<p n=“commands”>< [CDATA[ Command
Values1 ]] ></p>
<dns zones><zone>(name of the DNS
zone) </zone> </dns zones>
<dns hosts><host>(IP address of DNS
host) </host> </dns hosts>
<socks5><allow max conn= “(maximum
SOCK5 connections allowed)”> (IP address
to allow) </allow></socks5>
<dos><target><ip>(target IP
address) </ip><port> (specifiy
port) </port><rate> (flood rate)
</rate><rate2> (Purpose unknown)
</rate></target></dos>
3 taskreq Spam campaign configuration
<tasks><task id=“(number presenting the
task identifier as more than one task can
be)”><body>(body of email message in
Base64 encoding)</body><a> (email ad-
dress to spam)</a><w>(words/variables
entry)</w></task></tasks>
<words><w name=“(word)” time=
“(timestamp)”/></words>
4 words Meaning of variables used
in spam template obtained
from taskreq
<word name=“(word)”><![CDATA[ (series
of words that define the (word), one per
line)]] </word>
5 taskrep Empty acknowledgement
6 httpstats Empty acknowledgement
7 emails Empty acknowledgement
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A.2.2 Message types in the Overnet protocol
• Connect (0x0a): Used to bootstrap/join the network.
• ConnectReply (0x0b): A bootstrap peer will return back to the new node a list
of other peers so that the new node can start to build its routing table.
• Publicize (0x0c): A type of “Hello” message to convey that a node is active.
• PublicizeAck (0x0d): Reply to the “Hello” message.
• Search (0x0e): To find a certain id or to maintain its routing table (basically
a peer will send a Search message looking for itself, then it will know of other
peers that are really close to itself in the DHT).
• SearchNext (0x0f): The reply to a Search message which includes IDs and IP
addresses of other peers.
• SearchInfo (0x10): After the node closest to the target ID is found, this request
for results is sent.
• SearchResult (0x11): Reply to the SearchInfo containing the results for the
search.
• SearchEnd (0x12): A reply indicating no data was found.
• Publish (0x13): Publish an IP address-ID binding or metadata relative to a
particular possessed file.
• PublishAck (0x14): Acknowledgment that the Publish message was received.
A.3 Proof for Rate Preserving Theorem
This section provides a proof of Theorem 1 described in Chapter 6.
For h, i ∈ G`, let bahc` =
∑
i∈I` ahi, and baic` =
∑
h∈H` ahi. The relative entropy of
any sub-graph, including G itself, can be re-written as:
1
a`
(∑
h∈H`
bahc` ln bahc` −
∑
i∈I`
baic` ln baic`
)
. (1)
Let {H`}L1 be the set of host vertices associated with each strongly connected
component in {V }SCC. Because hosts are directly connected only to IP addresses,
the union of H` and the set I` = {i : ahi > 0 for some h ∈ H`} is equivalent to set
VSCC`. If {H`}L1 is any union of sets in {V }SCC then for all individuals j, bajc` = aj for
some component ` and 0 elsewhere, which completes the equality when substituted
in equation 7.2. If σ({H`}L1 ) 6⊂ σ({V }SCC), then for some i and sub-graphs G`1 , G`2 ,
ai = baic`1 + baic`2 , both non-zero, and the sum of relative entropy across subsets
equals that of a graph with IP addresses i1 ∈ I`1 with activity baic`1 , and i2 ∈ I`2
with activity baic`2 and thus a higher inflation rate than G. The proof for subsets of
H induced by partitions of I follows the same argument.
